

# The Drivers of Resemblance in Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets<sup>\*†‡§</sup>

Forthcoming in *European Political Science Review*

Lucas Couto  
Aarhus University  
[lac@ps.au.dk](mailto:lac@ps.au.dk)

## Abstract

Recent studies have drawn attention to the importance of pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty presidential democracies. Despite this, much scholarship has neglected the period during which pre-electoral coalitions turn into governing coalitions. Through a systematic cross-case analysis of Latin American cases, this paper examines why some coalition governments largely resemble the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them while others do not. The results lend credence to the legislative status granted by pre-election coalition members to the government, the low polarisation among pre-electoral coalition members and the high ideological polarisation in the legislature to explain the resemblance between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. Intriguingly, case-based analysis suggests that the temporal distance to government inauguration plays, at best, a marginal role in this process. These findings contribute to the still-growing literature on pre-electoral coalitions in presidential democracies by shedding light on the complex causation behind the pathway from pre-electoral bargaining to fully developed coalition governments.

---

**\*Competing Interests:** The author declares no competing interests in the research, writing, and publication of this article.

**†Data Availability Statement:** Research documentation, data, and replication files are openly available in: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/YL2TGH>.

**‡Funding Statement:** This research was funded by CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior) through its scholarship for master's studies.

**§Acknowledgements:** I am grateful to Adrián Albala, Frederico Bertholini, André Borges, and Raimondas Ibenskas for their insightful comments on an early version of this article. I am also indebted to several anonymous reviewers and the EPSR editors for their constructive feedback and critical engagement with the paper. Finally, this paper has also greatly benefited from the methodological literature on configurational comparative methods, without which it would never have come to fruition. All remaining errors are my own.

**Keywords:** Coalitional Presidentialism, Government Formation, Latin America, Pre-Electoral Coalitions, Qualitative Comparative Analysis

## 1 Introduction

In 2010, the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) launched Rousseff's presidential candidacy with an eye on extending its streak of presidential election victories in Brazil. In order to increase its candidate's odds, the PT built a broad pre-electoral coalition, encompassing not less than ten parties. However, even if the PT ultimately won the presidential contest, not all pre-electoral coalition party members were invited to take a seat in the cabinet when Rousseff was sworn into office. Despite still providing informal support for the government, the Social Christian Party (PSC, *Partido Social Cristão*) publicly voiced its dissatisfaction with being excluded from the coalition cabinet. The PSC's party leader emphatically complained that they did not have a single portfolio seat despite being a former member of the pre-electoral alliance and having a legislative seat share similar to other coalition party members ([Azevedo, 2012](#)).

In a similar story, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR, *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*) formed a pre-election alliance so as to back its candidate in the 1989 Bolivian presidential election. Once again, notwithstanding the alliance's victory, the president-elect party broke up with the pre-electoral pact and gave birth to a government not envisioned by the original multiparty coalition. This case is especially symbolic as the MIR did not assign any top office position to former pre-electoral coalition party members, thereby favouring the construction of a brand-new post-electoral coalition arrangement.<sup>1</sup>

Together, these cases raise the question as to what drives the translation of pre-election alliances into coalition governments in multiparty presidential democracies. This question features prominently as the literature frequently adopts an unexamined assumption that pre-electoral coalitions are automatically transformed into coalition cabinets. Even though pre-electoral coalitions exert notable influence on the government formation process ([Borges, Turgeon and Albala, 2021](#); [Carroll, 2007](#)), recent scholarship has argued

that, at least in presidentialism, the process from electoral alliances to cabinet formation is not as straightforward as it seems (Couto, 2025). Hence, the main aim of this study is to contribute to this burgeoning literature by unpacking the reasons as to why some coalition governments closely match the pre-electoral pacts that brought them forth while others do not.

Studying the process by which pre-election coalitions are turned into coalition cabinets is pertinent for several reasons. Looking at non-*formateur* parties first, their strategies rely to some extent on knowing whether they will be in the government. Even though parties have different approaches to making their organisations grow (Borges, Albala and Burtnik, 2017; Panebianco, 1988), pre-election coalition party members may be counting on the fact that they will have access to the spoils of office if the pre-election alliance succeeds in the national contest. As such, being excluded from the government potentially undermines parties' objectives in the short and long run, especially if they aimed to control portfolios to channel pork barrel resources to their constituencies (Batista, 2023; Meireles, 2024) or expected to hold a highly regarded portfolio, which could have boosted their votes in the next elections in return (Batista, Power and Zucco, 2024). In addition, although elected governments have plausible reasons for not deviating grossly from policy commitments made prior to the elections (Kellam, 2017; Naurin, Soroka and Markwat, 2019), government membership increases parties' chances of making policies close to their preferences. The experience of coalition governments in parliamentary democracies tells us that parties may even use the portfolio allocation process to keep tabs on which policies are to be implemented by the government (Fernandes, Meinfelder and Moury, 2016), and there is no reason why this should not be replicated in presidential democracies. As a result, even if parties can resort to alternative methods to promote the oversight of the government's policy-making (Silva and Medina, 2023; Thijm and Fernandes, 2024; Thijm, 2024), losing cabinet participation can have deleterious consequences for pre-electoral coalition parties when it comes to the degree to which the policy-making process is attuned to their policy preferences. On the other hand, understanding why *formateurs* stick to their pre-electoral coalitions contributes to the stream of studies interested in

gauging to what extent presidents use their institutional powers for their own benefit (Ariotti and Golder, 2018; Silva, 2023).

I argue that the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble pre-electoral coalitions depends on the blend of five conditions: i) the pre-electoral coalition's legislative status, ii) the level of polarisation within pre-electoral coalitions, iii) the ideological polarisation in the legislature, iv) the temporal constraint between election results and the inauguration day, and v) presidents' constitutional powers. In doing so, my claim draws on several but different theories of government formation, namely explanations based on office, policy and institutional assumptions. In this way, I draw on diverse streams of research to further add to the discussion about when and why presidents and their parties honour their office commitments to pre-election coalition partners.

To do so, this paper subscribes to a configurational approach to studying the government formation process in multiparty presidential democracies. To be sure, research on coalition cabinets based on set-theoretic methods is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Albala, 2021; Viatkin, 2023). Even still, it bears noting that set theory appears to be especially suitable here for three reasons. In the first place, past scholarship has shown that the influence of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation is conditioned by at least one other factor, namely legislative polarisation, in Latin America (Couto, 2025). This suggests that the craft of coalition cabinets—especially when factoring in pre-electoral coordination—comes from the confluence of factors rather than the predominance of any single isolated element. Notably, this goes hand in glove with one of the primary goals of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (henceforth, QCA): to capture the combinations of conditions that account for a given outcome (Rönkkö, Maula and Wennberg, 2025). Second, the use of QCA allows me to conduct a case-centred research and bring case knowledge to help unpack what makes post-electoral coalitions congruent with their pre-electoral strategies. Substantially, this case-based perspective offers insights that are elusive to the traditional large-N studies, where the process of learning from cases usually does not feature in the spotlight (e.g. Albala, Borges and Silva, 2024). Third, employing a set-theoretic method provides me with flexibility to derive a theory-

guided case selection. In contrast to purely quantitative research, I purposefully select on the dependent variable to ensure that all cases derive from pre-electoral coalition formation and result in multiparty governments, thus fully aligning theory with empirical scrutiny.

I start in the next section by briefly presenting the literature on government formation in presidentialism and raising empirical expectations to explain the similarity between coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral conception. Thereafter, the third section showcases my research design. More specifically, this section is divided into three parts, in which I first discuss the advantages of QCA to the study of coalition formation, then I detail my case selection, and lastly, I show the calibration process of the outcome and the conditions. In the fourth section, I conduct and reveal the results of necessity and sufficiency analyses. The fifth section briefly refers to the robustness tests, and the sixth illustrates the QCA findings with case-based discussions. Finally, the last section presents my concluding remarks along with suggestions for future research.

## 2 The High Road between Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Coalition Cabinets

In presidential and parliamentary democracies alike, *formateur* parties do not easily attain a parliamentary majority on their own in fragmented party systems. Not coincidentally, coalition governments have become increasingly more common in European parliamentary democracies (Müller, Bäck and Hellström, 2024). Likewise, in recent years, multiparty governments have emerged in presidential democracies that were historically ruled by single-party governments, such as Costa Rica (Hernández-Naranjo and Guzmán-Castillo, 2018). In such a context, cabinet management arises as one of the main tools available to presidents for securing a legislative majority and, therefore, preventing troublesome deadlocks in the legislature (Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power, 2018; Chasquetti, 2001; Cheibub, 2007). Pre-election coalitions, in particular, help presidents in building their cabinets (Borges et al., 2021; Carroll, 2007).

Nevertheless, pre-election coalition parties do not always grant a legislative majority to the president-elect in both chambers of the legislature. For this reason, it is not unusual for presidential parties to strive to increase their coalition's share of seats in the aftermath of elections (Albala, 2017). More generally, this process falls under the umbrella of the coalition bargaining process: the president-elect's party opens or reopens negotiations with the remaining parties that have legislative representation to broaden the government's breadth in the legislature. Importantly, this process is beneficial for both presidential parties and future coalition partners. On the one hand, as mentioned above, cabinet participation is a golden opportunity for parties to push their goals related to office, policy, and vote. On the other hand, presidents remove an obstacle—the lack of support in the legislature—for advancing their policy agenda. Moreover, as coalition governments rarely produce and publicly disclose written coalition agreements in a multiparty presidential context, policy bargaining in the government formation process is seldom plagued by the process of setting down the terms of the coalition compromise, as is the case in parliamentary democracies (Bergman, Angelova, Bäck and Müller, 2024; Moury, 2013). Although this may incur some costs for governance later, it represents one less concern at the bargaining table in the lead-up to the new administration.

Against this backdrop, the expectation is that the composition of post-electoral governments should differ from that of pre-electoral pacts when the latter falls short of securing a minimal winning coalition. Reversing the argument, *formateur* parties ought not to look out for new partners when pre-electoral coalition members successfully help the presidential party to hold a majority in the legislature. By adopting a purely office-seeking premise, this happens as none of the parties would be willing to share the spoils of being in power with parties that are needless in terms of securing enough legislative support for the government (Leiserson, 1966; Riker, 1962).

Yet, as parties have other motivations beyond attaining office, the majority status of pre-electoral coalitions is hypothesised as a causally relevant factor, though not sufficiently to explain why coalition cabinets build on their pre-election coalitions. This is not only in line with the combinatorial logic of configurational comparative methods, but also does

justice to the existence of different motivations that guide the behaviour of politicians, such as the promotion of their policy interests (Axelrod, 1970). In other words, the majority granted to the government by pre-election coalition members is a prime example of an INUS condition, where the condition is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about the outcome on its own, but it is nevertheless an indispensable part of a specific combination that accounts for the outcome (Mello, 2021).<sup>2</sup>

**H1:** Majority pre-electoral coalitions operate as INUS conditions to yield coalition cabinets with a similar composition relative to their pre-electoral composition.

High within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is another potential trigger for changes in the composition of pre-electoral alliances in their way of forming coalition governments. Even if parties tend not to coalesce when the ideological distance among them is significant (Kellam, 2017), some pre-electoral alliances are still composed of parties from different ends of the political spectrum (Indridason, 2011). When this happens, pre-electoral coalition members potentially disagree over several issues on coalition governance, such as who gets which portfolio, which policy is to be prioritised, and whether and which party should be invited to be part of the coalition cabinet. As a consequence, a heightened level of ideological polarisation may ultimately lead to the fracture of pre-election pacts, while a limited ideological disagreement at the party level may account for coalition cabinets that preserve their pre-election foundation.

Crucially, however, the government formation stage does not revolve exclusively around policy congruence among eventual governing parties. As discussed above, concerns about the government seat share, among other conditions, come into play in coalition formation. Thus, I also expect ideological homogeneity among pre-election coalition partners to contribute to forming coalition governments grounded in their pre-election roots, but I do not expect it to paint the whole picture.

**H2:** Low within pre-electoral coalition polarisation is an INUS condition to render coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins.

Turning to the party system level, Couto (2025) has recently argued legislative polarisation—the weighted distance between parties in the policy space—moderates the extent to which pre-electoral coalitions influence government formation. In a similar vein, I argue here that legislative polarisation also plays a role in the process of pre-electoral coalitions turning into coalition cabinets. The key point is that lower levels of legislative polarisation make multiparty bargaining more straightforward for *formateur* parties insofar as they have more leeway to break from the pre-electoral alliance if they wish to do so. That is, when ideological differences among parties are not pervasive, *formateur* parties have more incentives to build coalition cabinets that push forward their office and policy interests, even if it comes at the expense of cabinet membership for former pre-election coalition partners. Contrariwise, parties' ideological placements far apart in the party system make bargaining dynamics beyond pre-electoral commitments increasingly costly, as presidents might struggle to accommodate office and policy priorities from other parties. Under these circumstances, presidential parties have an extra incentive to stick with their pre-election partners.

Nevertheless, I claim that legislative polarisation does not influence government formation in isolation; that is, it should matter only if accompanied by other conditions. To see how this is the case, consider a pre-electoral coalition in a context where parties are not too ideologically different from one another. Even though the presidential party arguably has more freedom to choose whom to ally with in this scenario, why would it change the composition of the pre-electoral alliance in the first place? Conversely, if *formateur* parties have an underpinning reason to sever ties with (or to keep) their original pre-electoral commitments, legislative polarisation should facilitate (or complicate) the endeavours of *formateur* parties.

In summary, as with the other hypotheses, the expectation is that legislative polarisation relates to the similarity between pre-electoral pacts and coalition cabinets in multiparty presidential democracies. That said, in the absence of complementary conditions, legislative polarisation would be of little use in influencing government formation. Thus:

**H3:** Elevated levels of legislative polarisation are an INUS condition to the similarity between coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral predecessors.

One of the main characteristics of presidential regimes is that presidents serve constitutionally fixed terms, thereby not being responsible to an elected assembly (Cheibub, 2007; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Based on this, the literature draws attention to the fact that constitutional or electoral rules clarify when the presidents' term in office must come to an end. However, scholars more often than not overlook that the same institutions are also explicit when presidents are to be sworn into office (Albala, 2017). That is, presidential regimes, unlike their parliamentary counterparts (Ecker and Meyer, 2015; Golder, 2010), cannot have several rounds of multiparty bargaining before the *formateur* gets into office because there is a temporal bound between the conclusion of the electoral process and the handover of power to the next government.

Overall, institutional claims have found mixed support in research on coalitional presidentialism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Freudenreich, 2016). Still, past scholarship has pointed out that pre-electoral pacts are influenced by institutional settings (Ferrara and Herron, 2005; Spoon and West, 2015). In this way, I argue that the time span between the electoral period and the inauguration day influences the extent to which coalition cabinets resemble their pre-electoral pacts. A shorter distance constrains the president-elect's parties from drastically changing coalition members, encouraging them to build the government around pre-electoral alliances. By contrast, a longer distance between elections and the inauguration day allows presidents to think more carefully about the composition of their government.

However, again, we should not expect presidents to change the partisan composition of their coalition arrangements just because they have fewer constraints to do so. This is similar to legislative polarisation. Just as ideological polarisation is not expected to be entirely responsible for changes in coalition configurations, neither is a short temporal distance before the president-elect assumes office. Hence, I theorise that this time-related boundedness is one component of a broader chain to cause post-election coalition cabinets

to bear a resemblance to their pre-election commitments. As such:

**H4:** A short distance between the end of the electoral process and the president's first day in office is an INUS condition to the likeness between pre-electoral alliances and subsequent coalition cabinets.

As the last piece of the puzzle, the transition of pre-electoral pacts to coalition cabinets may also be contingent on the extent to which presidents are granted tools to promote the governability of their governments. Indeed, previous empirical studies have shown that presidential powers influence overall patterns of coalition formation ([Amorim Neto, 2006](#); [Martínez-Gallardo, 2012](#); [Silva, 2023](#)). More specifically, presidents with extensive formal prerogatives may care less about fulfilling office pre-electoral commitments than those without such powers. This is because the former can appoint their ministers without major trouble and still govern by issuing decree-laws, dictating legislative agenda or vetoing undesired bills, while the latter must come to terms with the legislature to avoid getting into a collision course and guarantee successful passage of policy.

This should especially be the case for the transition period between pre-electoral coalitions and the formation of coalition cabinets, as presidents are prone to enjoy the honeymoon in their first year in office, thus further discouraging constitutionally weak presidents from disturbing executive-legislative relations at the outset of their term. Given the high stakes in this regard, unlike the previous hypotheses, low presidential powers should lead to congruent post-election coalitions regardless of the other constellation of conditions:

**H5:** Low presidential powers are sufficient for engendering coalition cabinets similar to the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them.

### 3 Research Design

To evaluate the claims around the process by which pre-electoral coalitions become coalition cabinets, I make use of QCA. In broad terms, QCA is a set-theoretic method and technique which aims to approximate variable- and case-oriented approaches ([Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux and Ragin, 2009](#); [Ragin, 2008](#); [Schneider and Wagemann, 2012](#)). By doing so, QCA puts cases in the limelight while also allowing the detection of empirical patterns in a cross-case fashion ([Mello, 2021](#)).

In the scholarship, the primary motivation for applying QCA lies in the fact that it provides further leverage for causal claims by allowing researchers to explore causal complexity. In this study, I am particularly interested in grasping the conjunctural causation involved in government formation under presidentialism. That is, I rely on QCA to investigate which combinations of conditions credibly cause the outcome under study (i.e. coalition resemblance across pre- and post-election periods). Thus, in line with most of the empirical expectations derived in the last section, the primary analysis lens falls on the co-occurrence of conditions rather than the existence of individually sufficient conditions.<sup>3</sup>

My case selection is slightly particular, as I deliberately select, in varied ways, my observations based on the dependent variable. Despite being a criticised approach following the standards of conventional quantitative literature ([Geddes, 2003](#); [King, Keohane and Verba, 1994](#)), this strategy makes sense depending on the researcher's aims ([Ragin, 2008](#)). In this study, I do not intend to generalise my findings to all instances of government formation in Latin America. Rather, I am most concerned with coalition cabinets derived from pre-electoral alliances. Given that most coalition governments originate from some sort of multiparty pre-electoral coordination in multiparty presidential democracies ([Albala and Couto, 2023](#)), this research design still enables me to cover a substantial portion of the coalition cabinets formed in Latin America. Moreover, I ensure conceptual consistency by studying specifically coalitional arrangements. This happens as I remove pre-electoral coalitions that culminate in single-party governments from the anal-

ysis. In so doing, I certify that my outcome, namely the correspondence between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, remains grounded throughout the process by which coalition partners pass through the electoral period. Otherwise, the underlying conceptual validity is severely put into question. In the Supplementary Material, I discuss in greater detail which other cases are left out of the analysis, such as exclusively *electoral* coalitions. Table 1 presents the pre- and post-electoral coalition composition of the 31 cases to be analysed in this paper.

The calibration process of the conditions and the outcome provides the basis for QCA analyses. As a set-theoretic method, the calibration accounts for whether cases are *in* or *out* of a given set. Notwithstanding the proliferation of QCA variants in recent years (Mello, 2021), QCA has three more well-known specifications (crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy-set QCA), each holding specific ways for calibrating conditions (Medina, Castillo-Ortiz, Álamos Concha and Rihoux, 2017). The fuzzy-set QCA (henceforth, fsQCA) is the most suitable QCA variant for current purposes. The reason for this is that the fsQCA allows us to consider to what extent cases belong to a set by inputting a continuous value membership between 0.0 and 1.0 (Ragin, 2008). This, in turn, gives us the upper hand in using more fine-grained information to capture more complex concepts, such as coalition resemblance and legislative polarisation. Below, I briefly discuss the decision-making process to calibrate conditions and the outcome.<sup>4</sup>

To begin with, the outcome *Coalition Resemblance* captures to what extent coalition cabinets are similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that preceded them. To calculate membership in the outcome, I take into account the seat share that pre-electoral coalition members contribute to the coalition's total seat share in the lower house. In this measure, I disregard the president-elect party's legislative contingent, as very few presidential parties fail to acquire cabinet membership in the upcoming government (Amorim Neto, 1998). If *formateur* parties' share of seats had remained in the calculation in the first place, *Coalition Resemblance* would have inflated values and, thus, unduly lessen the contribution of the other pre-electoral coalition members to the governing coalition.

Table 1: Pre- and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America

Country (N)	Government	Start of the term	Pre-Electoral Coalition Composition	Coalition Cabinet Composition
Argentina (2)	De La Rúa	1999	UCR - Frepaso	UCR - Frepaso
	Macri	2015	PRO - UCR - ARI	PRO - UCR - ARI
Bolivia (3)	Siles	1982	MNRI - MIR - PCB	MNRI - MIR - PCB - PDC
	Paz Zamora	1989	MIR - MNR-V - PCML	MIR - ADN
	Banzer	1997	ADN - NFR	ADN - CONDEPA - MIR - NFR - UCS
Brazil (6)	Cardoso I	1995	PSDB - PFL - PTB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PMDB
	Cardoso II	1999	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB	PSDB - PFL - PTB - PPB - PMDB - PPS
	Lula I	2003	PT - PL - PCdoB	PT - PL - PCdoB - PDT - PPS - PSB - PTB - PV
	Lula II	2007	PT - PCdoB	PT - PCdoB - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PTB - PV
	Rousseff I	2011	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PRB - PSB - PSC	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PR - PSB - PSC - PP
	Rousseff II	2015	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD	PT - PCdoB - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PROS - PSD - PTB
Chile (7)	Aylwin	1990	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch	PDC - PPD - PR - PSch
	Frei	1994	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Lagos	2000	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch	PDC - PPD - PRSD - PSch
	Bachelet I	2006	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD	PSch - PDC - PPD - PRSD
	Piñera I	2010	RN - UDI	RN - UDI
	Bachelet II	2014	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC	PSch - PCch - PDC - PPD - PRSD - MAS - IC
	Piñera II	2018	RN - UDI - EVOP	RN - UDI - EVOP
Colombia (2)	Uribe II	2006	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD	CR - PCC - PU - ALAS - PD - PDA
	Santos II	2014	PU - CR - PLC	PU - CR - PLC - PCC
Dom. Republic (1)	Medina II	2016	PLD - PRD	PLD - PRD
Panamá (7)	Endara	1990	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA	PPA - MOLIRENA - PDC - PLA
	Balladares	1994	PRD - LIBRE - PALA	PRD - LIBRE - PALA - SOLID
	Moscoso	1999	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD	PPA - MOLIRENA - MORENA - PCD
	Torrijos	2004	PRD - POPULAR	PRD - POPULAR
	Martinelli	2009	PCD - MOLIRENA - PPA - UP	PCD - PPA
	Varela	2014	PPA - POPULAR	PPA - POPULAR - PCD
Cortizo	2019	PRD - MOLIRENA	PRD - MOLIRENA	
Venezuela (3)	Lusinchi	1984	AD - URD	AD - URD
	Caldera	1994	CN - MAS	CN - MAS
	Chávez	1999	MVR - MAS - PPT	MVR - MAS - PPT - PCV

Source: Amorim Neto (2019); Borges et al. (2021); Freudenreich (2016); Lopes (2022); Silva (2023); and the countries' respective electoral committees.

Overall, this measure is very similar to the one developed and employed by [Albala, Borges and Couto \(2023\)](#) to study the effects of pre-electoral coalitions on cabinet duration in Latin America. In fact, this measure is straightforward if coalition cabinets (i) keep the same partners from the electoral period or (ii) are enlarged to include additional partners. However, this calculation fails to take into account coalition reductions, as pre-electoral coalition members would still account for all the coalition's share of seats. In order to hold a holistic view of all the possible changes a pre-election alliance can undergo, I slightly modify the formula to also factor in such occurrences by inverting the relationship between pre-election and coalition cabinets. That is, when pre-electoral coalition members are expelled from the coalitional pact, I *calculate what is the proportion* of the post-electoral coalition cabinet's share of seats *relative to* the total share of seats pre-election coalitions would have if their composition had not changed.<sup>5</sup>

Depending on the nature of the modification, the formula for *Coalition Resemblance* is, then, the combined share of seats of pre-election coalition members in relation to the coalition's overall share of seats, or the other way around, as given by the following formula:

$$\text{Coalition Resemblance} = \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^p \text{PEC's Seat Share}}{\sum_{j=1}^c \text{Cabinet's Seat Share}} \vee \frac{\sum_{i=1}^c \text{Cabinet's Seat Share}}{\sum_{j=1}^p \text{PEC's Seat Share}} \right)$$

where  $p$  is the number of pre-election coalition members and  $c$  corresponds to the total number of coalition partners in the post-election scenario. Presidential parties are excluded from the equation.

Regardless of whether or how pre-election coalitions change from one period to another, full set membership in *Coalition Resemblance* indicates that coalition cabinets thoroughly resemble pre-electoral coalition members. Meanwhile, full non-membership embodies coalition cabinets and pre-electoral coalitions that are entirely different from one another.

Moving on to explanatory conditions, *Majority* refers to whether pre-electoral coalitions hold a legislative majority after the election results. To belong to this set, I consider that pre-election coalitions should have at least a semi-majority (more than 45% of the share of seats) in one of the legislative chambers. Importantly, given the existence of ‘parties-for-hire’ across Latin America (Kellam, 2015), this threshold takes into account that presidents and their governing coalitions can still govern even if they do not secure a clear majority in the legislature. This is possible through the formation of *ad hoc* legislative majorities on individual pieces of legislation, in which presidents guarantee the passage of government policy by making use of their toolbox (Chaisty et al., 2018; Raile, Pereira and Power, 2011), such as through the management of budgetary transfers for pork-barrel politics (Bertholini and Pereira, 2017; Pereira, Bertholini and Melo, 2023) and partisan appointments in the bureaucracy (Bersch, Lopez and Taylor, 2023). In this circumstance, cases are assigned a 0.6 score, while cases with a larger seat share receive higher set membership scores. Conversely, pre-electoral pacts that fail to reach at least a semi-majority are more outside than inside *Majority* and, accordingly, receive lower scores according to their seat share.

Next, *Low Within Polarisation* refers to the weighted ideological distance between pre-election coalition members, whereas *High Legislative Polarisation* captures the ideological polarisation in the legislature. The qualitative anchors across both sets are not exactly reversed to one another, albeit they are based on the same polarisation index developed by Dalton (2008). This happens because legislative polarisation naturally tends to be higher than polarisation found within pre-electoral alliances. The former includes all parties in party systems, including extremist parties, whereas the latter often revolves around parties with similar ideological preferences (Kellam, 2017).

*High Temporal Constraint* corresponds to the distance, in days, between the election day and the day presidents are sworn into office. The empirical anchors of this set are established mostly by looking at observed patterns found in the data, since the time lapse that separates the end of elections from the beginning of a new government in presidential democracies has not been profoundly studied yet. Most importantly, since

second-round presidential elections cannot logically result in lower temporal constraints for the president-elect compared to first-round elections, the crossover point is set at 70 days. This places most cabinets preceded by run-off elections as being inside the set, with the exception of the Argentine cases and Bachelet II and Piñera II in Chile. Set full membership is defined as 55 days, which is equivalent to a one-and-a-half-month period, whereas full exclusion is set at 85 days, a relatively long period even by the standards of parliamentary democracies (Golder, 2010).

At last, *Low Presidential Powers* is associated with the degree to which presidents are powerful actors in the political system. While indices of presidential powers abound, the calibration rests specifically on Doyle and Elgie's (2016) measurement. This is so because this measure considers presidential powers as a whole instead of focusing on a single dimension. For example, rather than using decree and veto powers as proxies for presidential powers, this measure encompasses all presidential prerogatives, such as the presidents' capability to introduce bills, appoint, dismiss and retain ministers at their own discretion, apply for judicial review, and so on. To locate empirical anchors, I once again rely mostly on empirical gaps found in the data, positioning full membership at 0.3 and full exclusion from the set at 0.5. However, the cross-over point is specifically set at 0.405. This ensures that the Dominican and Venezuelan cases are *in* the reference set.<sup>6</sup> The assignment of the Dominican case follows the discussion that, though historically strong (Belén Sánchez and Lozano, 2012), presidential powers are in decline (Marsteintredet, 2020) and presidents do not boast control over their cabinets to the same degree as other presidents in the region (Araújo, Silva and Vieira, 2016). As for Venezuela, this relates to the constitution endowing presidents with formally limited powers in the country at the time (Crisp, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992).

To summarise, Table 2 provides an overview of the conditions and the outcome, as well as the respective procedures for calibration and the rules for the calibration process.

Table 2: Overview of the Calibration of the Outcome and the Conditions

Set	Definition	Procedure	Calibration
Coalition Resemblance (CR)	The degree to which pre-electoral coalitions resemble coalition cabinets	Direct Assignment	Percentage to which pre-electoral coalitions reflect post-electoral cabinets' composition in terms of seat share.  1 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative status in both chambers 0.8 = Pre-electoral parties grant a majority legislative in at least one of the chambers
Majority (MAJ)	The pre-electoral coalition controls a majority in the legislature	Direct Assignment	0.6 = Pre-electoral parties grant a semi-majority legislative in at least one of the chambers 0.4 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in both chambers 0.2 = Pre-electoral parties grant nearly 35% in at least one of the chambers 0 = Pre-electoral parties grant less than 35% in both chambers
Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL)	Pe-electoral coalition members are in close proximity on the left-right ideological dimension	Direct Method	FM = 1.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 3.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL)	Parties are ideologically far apart in the party system	Direct Method	FM = 4.0 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index CO = 2.7 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index FE = 1.5 in the Dalton's Polarisation Index
High Temporal Constraint (HTEMP)	A short distance between the end of the elections and the inauguration day	Direct Method	FM = 55 days CO = 70 days FE = 85 days
Low Presidential Powers (LPP)	Presidents are constitutionally weak	Direct Method	FM = 0.3 in <a href="#">Doyle and Elgie (2016)</a> CO = 0.405 in <a href="#">Doyle and Elgie (2016)</a> FE = 0.5 in <a href="#">Doyle and Elgie (2016)</a>

Source: [Borges, Lloyd and Vommaro \(2024\)](#); [Dalton \(2008\)](#); [Doyle and Elgie \(2016\)](#); [Freudenreich \(2016\)](#); [Silva \(2023\)](#); and the countries' respective electoral committees.

Note: FM stands for full membership in the set, CO for cross-over point, and FE for full exclusion in the set.

## 4 Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis of configurational comparative research is based on statements of necessity and sufficiency. In short, necessary conditions are indispensable for the occurrence of the outcome ([Ragin, 2008](#)). In turn, sufficient conditions are capable of producing the outcome on their own ([Medina et al., 2017](#); [Mello, 2021](#)).

Unless the interest lies in finding minimally necessary disjunctions of minimally sufficient combinations ([Haesebrouck and Thomann, 2022](#)), QCA empirical analysis operates analyses of necessity and sufficiency separately. In order not to produce untenable assumptions in the analysis of sufficiency, it is advisable that the analysis of necessity must be conducted in advance ([Schneider and Wagemann, 2012](#)). In the analysis of necessary conditions, the literature argues that a 0.9 consistency threshold and a 0.6 relevance of necessity score should be in place to find meaningful non-trivial necessary relations between conditions and the outcome ([Oana, Schneider and Thomann, 2021](#); [Schneider, 2018](#);

Table 3: Necessity Test for Coalition Resemblance

<b>Disjunction</b>	<b>Consistency</b>	<b>Coverage</b>	<b>Relevance</b>
MAJ + HTEMP	0.916	0.859	0.601

Note: In configurational rationale, the sign “+” is equivalent to the logical OR.

Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). By applying these recommendations, Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the resemblance of post-electoral coalition governments vis-à-vis their pre-electoral configuration.

The necessity test indicates that only a single combination of conditions is necessary to explain the commonalities between pre-electoral pacts and post-electoral governments. The analysis reveals that either achieving a majority status (MAJ) or facing a short period until the government is officially set in motion (HTEMP) is pivotal for a strong similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions.<sup>7</sup>

Closely following the necessity test, the next stage in a typical QCA framework involves engaging in sufficiency analysis. Much of the analysis of sufficient conditions boils down to the construction of the truth table and its subsequent minimisation process. The reason for this is that the truth table systematically organises all possible combinations of conditions into distinct rows, assigns empirical cases to each row according to the cases’ degree of membership to every set, and shows the extent to which each row exhibits a sufficient relationship with the outcome. Then, based on the information in the truth table, the minimisation process is charged with applying Boolean algebra to generate a “recipe” that supposedly explains the outcome of interest.

Recall that the previous sections devised five empirical expectations to account for the convergence between pre-electoral coalitions and their post-electoral heirs, and that this resulted in the creation of five explanatory conditions. Against this backdrop, the truth table for coalition resemblance generates 32 logically possible combinations, as the number of rows in a truth table is given by  $2^n$ , where  $n$  is the number of conditions in the study. As listed in Table 4,<sup>8</sup> the empirical instances are distributed along 13 configurations, with all the remaining rows representing logical remainders,<sup>9</sup> which have been omitted for ease of interpretation. As a result, since logical reasoning provides a far

greater number of possible combinations than those that actually exist in the real world, the present sufficiency analysis is confronted with limited diversity (Ragin and Sonnett, 2008).

Table 4: Truth Table for Coalition Resemblance

Condition					Outcome		N	Consistency	PRI	Cases
MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	HTEMP	LPP	CR					
1	1	1	0	0	1	5	1.000	1.000	Aylwin, Frei, Bachelet II, Piñera II, Torrijos	
1	0	1	1	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Rousseff I, Rousseff II	
1	1	0	0	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Cardoso II, Endara	
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.997	0.995	Uribe II	
1	1	1	1	0	1	6	0.995	0.994	De La Rúa, Lagos, Bachelet I, Piñera I, Martinelli, Cortizo	
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.988	0.979	Siles	
1	1	0	1	1	1	3	0.975	0.965	Medina II, Santos II, Lusinchi	
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.934	0.903	Chávez	
0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.871	0.783	Cardoso I, Balladares, Moscoso	
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.804	0.661	Lula I	
0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.790	0.691	Banzer, Caldera	
0	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.666	0.592	Macri, Lula II, Varela	
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.569	0.299	Paz Zamora	

However, as limited diversity is ubiquitous in empirical research, QCA does have some remedies for treating logical remainders. All in all, the answer lies in the different ways to handle them in the minimisation process. Here, I opt for partially including logical remainders in the logical minimisation of the truth table. More specifically, while difficult counterfactuals are dismissed, easy counterfactuals—logical reminders in line with theoretical and substantive knowledge (Dusa, 2019, Chap. 8; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 9)—are included in the analysis. Accordingly, the counterfactual analysis allows including educated hunches in the sufficiency test on what would have possibly occurred had the empty truth table rows had empirical cases. Hence, as only a fraction of the counterfactuals is in the minimisation process, the analysis of sufficient conditions rests on the intermediate solution.<sup>10</sup>

As the final steps before assessing set relations based on sufficiency, I employ the

Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) to minimise the truth table, given the existence of a necessary disjunction. I also set the inclusion score for consistency at 0.8, a value slightly above the bare minimum 0.75 consistency threshold recommended by the literature (Mello, 2021, Chap. 6; Ragin, 2008, Chap. 3). Furthermore, the directional expectations have the exact directions as the hypothesised conditions, such as *Majority* is expected to lead to coalition resemblance, as does *Low Within Polarisation* and so forth. Coupled with the previous features, this settings leads to an analysis of sufficiency that produces four causal pathways to account for *Coalition Resemblance*, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Enhanced Intermediate Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ *LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.292	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
~LWPOL *HLPOL * HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0.063	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, Siles
HLPOL * HTEMP *LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.043	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL * HLPOL * ~HTEMP *~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Balladares, Bachelet II, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Piñera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.920	0.907	0.807		

The first path indicates that pre-electoral coalitions that hold a legislative majority and consist of parties with similar policy preferences make coalition cabinets to be heavily based on their pre-election antecessors. To attest to the prominence of this configuration, it has the highest scores for consistency and raw coverage, in addition to uniquely covering several pre-election coalitions that ultimately led to governing coalitions. This path, thus, provides sound supportive evidence for the notion that *formateur* parties work towards preserving pre-electoral pacts that grant a majority in the legislature to the government and are simultaneously ideologically coherent.

Next, the second path highlights the combination of ideological heterogeneity within the pre-electoral pact, high legislative polarisation and a short period until the govern-

ment's first day in office to the conversion of pre-electoral pacts into coalition governments. Similarly, high legislative polarisation and high temporal constraints are also components of the third path. The difference resides in the fact that, instead of low within polarisation, Path 3 envisions that this configuration occurs in tandem with constitutionally weak presidents.

The last pathway poses an intriguing combination. It tells us that, even facing a considerable time until official government formation and with constitutionally moderate to strong presidents, pre-electoral alliances serve as a basis for post-electoral governments when the party system they are embedded in is highly polarised, but their coalition members hold ideologically similar policy views. This combination is particularly noteworthy for severely threatening the necessary claim between coalition resemblance and the disjunction between *Majority* and *High Temporal Constraint*.

Together, the four paths yielded an overall solution formula with a high consistency score of 0.920 and a significant proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) of 0.907, covering roughly 80% of the cases in the analysis. These scores amount to a solution formula that covers a significant number of cases and contains a single instance that weakens its sufficiency claims.<sup>11</sup>

The analysis of sufficient conditions simultaneously challenges one empirical expectation while providing initial support for the others. Specifically, building coalition cabinets based on pre-electoral alliances was expected to be a central strategy for weak presidents. However, the analysis of sufficiency shows that no condition is individually sufficient to account for the outcome; rather, the conjunctural causation of configurational comparative methods is reinforced, in the sense that the explanatory conditions are individually insufficient but jointly relevant in bringing about the similarity between post- and pre-election coalitions. Consequently, there is provisional support for MAJ, LWPOL, HLPOL, and HTEMP to be causally important factors for *Coalition Resemblance* when combined with one another and LPP.

To a lesser or greater extent, the findings indicate that every condition works as an

INUS condition. Despite this, the combination of *Majority* and *Low Within Polarisation*, and the individual condition of *High Legislative Polarisation* stand out in the results for a few reasons. Not only does the former cover the greatest number of cases among the four pathways, but it also provides additional support for recent findings in the literature (Albala et al., 2024). Meanwhile, the latter features in three out of the four paths, contrasting with other conditions, such as *Low Presidential Power*, which only appears once. No less importantly, the fact that legislative polarisation constrains the first cabinet built by the president-elect also resonates with prior literature (Couto, 2025). Accordingly, the first significant contribution of this study to the literature is to demonstrate that some past findings from variable-centred research are robust when closely examining the cases behind the conversion of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition cabinets. At the same time, however, it provides a much-needed refined portrait by highlighting how the transition from pre- to post-electoral coalitions cannot be explained by any single factor, but rather by the interplay among several contextual and institutional conditions. Crucially, a further qualification emerges from later within-case analyses: diverging from existing studies, the causal role of *High Temporal Constraint* in producing coalition resemblance is called into question.

If the set-theoretic analysis for sufficiency for coalition resemblance has yielded a wealth of findings, the results for the non-outcome (a dissonance in composition between pre-electoral coalitions and coalition cabinets) are largely uninformative given their low coverage. However, this was expected to some degree, as the conditions have primarily been calibrated to explain the similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. Consequently, a handful of potential explanatory conditions to account for the difference between pre- and post-electoral stages, such as a profound ideological difference among pre-electoral coalition members, have not been adequately captured. As recommended by best practices, the necessity and sufficiency analyses for the non-outcome are nevertheless available and can be found in the Supplementary Material.

## 5 Robustness Tests

By default, several methodological decisions in configurational comparative methods lie at the researcher's discretion, such as which procedure should be used to calibrate conditions, which benchmark should be applied in necessary and sufficient analyses, and so forth. Naturally, this raises concerns about the validity of QCA results, since they could be driven purely by researcher choices. To address this issue, the literature has come up with several tests to probe the soundness of QCA results (Ide, 2015; Oana and Schneider, 2024; Skaaning, 2011), which have been widely employed in QCA recent empirical research (e.g. Janzwood, 2020). For current purposes, these tests consist of changing the case selection, modifying the rules for calibrating conditions and the outcome, performing a variety of cluster analyses, and adjusting the consistency benchmark used in the analysis of sufficient conditions. Due to space constraints, these tests can be found in Section 8 in the Supplementary Material. Overall, the results found for the first three pathways in the original analysis remain largely consistent throughout all the tests. That said, Path 4 has shown to be largely sensitive to model specifications and  $\sim$ LWPOL is replaced in Path 2 in a couple of diagnostic tests.

## 6 Discussion and Case Studies

Even if QCA excels at bringing the cases to the fore, the present study has so far been much closer to a condition-oriented QCA than a case-oriented QCA.<sup>12</sup> To fill this gap, I now pass on to the discussion of how the solution derived in the second-to-last section applies to some cases. From reading the solution formula, the explanation of what makes coalition cabinets similar to their pre-electoral origins resides in four paths. Below, I select a few cases from each configuration to illustrate how conditions operate as gears towards *Coalition Resemblance*.

The first route towards coalition resemblance is marked by majority pre-election coalitions composed of ideologically like-minded members. This path is neatly exemplified by most of the Chilean coalition cabinets present in the analysis, such as Bachelet I and II,

Frei, and Lagos. By securing a legislative majority in one chamber and at least a semi-majority in the other, there was little reason to expel any party from the alliance or to bring in a new partner. Moreover, the closeness between pre-electoral coalition members on the left–right scale further reinforced the reasons for maintaining the pre-electoral pact. Despite bringing the Chilean cases as examples, this combination is not idiosyncratic to Chile. In Colombia, the right-wing pre-election coalitions led by Uribe and Santos in their re-election attempts exhibited similar features: despite minor changes, pre-electoral coalitions that held close to a majority in the legislature and were composed of parties with similar policy stances served as the bedrock for the upcoming governments.

In stark contrast, the second path combines the absence of policy congruence among pre-electoral coalition members with high overall ideological polarisation in the legislature and a short period until the government’s inauguration. This configuration speaks to Rousseff I and II in Brazil, where the ideological distance between pre-election coalition members on the left-right dimension should have resulted in the outright dismantling of the multiparty agreement at the post-electoral stage. This notwithstanding, pre-electoral coalitions still formed the basis of the first coalition cabinets following each election, resulting in a remarkably low ideological distance between government and opposition in both governments (Borges, 2021). Why was this the case? According to the second path, the explanation for this resides in the fact that the polarisation at the party system level was high, thereby implying that rearranging interparty negotiations would be costly. In fact, not including major centre-right parties in the ministerial allocation process would not only most likely have triggered a political crisis earlier than expected in Rousseff II (Hunter and Power, 2019) but was practically out of the question given that the vice-presidency was handed to a key right-of-centre party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB, *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*). In this context, it seems rather unlikely that Rousseff would have drastically promoted a change even if she had more time to reconsider the partisan composition of her cabinets. As this same story applies to Lula I, our confidence in the importance of *High Temporal Constraint* should be considerably reduced. Thus, the conclusion is that a contextual condition (i.e. legislative polarisation)

eased the transformation from pre-election alliances into governing coalitions even though pre-election coalition members were ideologically far apart from one another.

High legislative polarisation and low internal polarisation are at the core of the third and fourth paths, but in conjunction with different conditions. In broad terms, legislative polarisation is combined with formally weak presidents in the third path, whereas the fourth path connects it to non-weak heads of government and the absence of high temporal constraint.

The first government of Chávez in Venezuela is an example of the former path. To be fair, Chávez proceeded to take the first steps towards autocratic rule at the beginning of his government by concentrating power in the executive after a successful constitution-making process (Landau, 2019). Yet, at the time of his election, the then-constitution did not grant him enough power to defy the existing order on his own. In fact, pre-election coalition formation was a hard-won feat for Chávez, especially as it was part of the strategy to legitimise him in front of voters (Handlin, 2017). Coupled with the fact that the remaining parties had very different policy preferences from Chávez and the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR, *Movimiento V República*), it made little sense for Chávez not to base his government on the pre-electoral pact. More remarkably, there is virtually no indication that Maduro would ever have opened talks with opposition parties to enlarge his government had the temporal distance between elections and the inauguration day been larger (Brewer-Carías, 2010). In contrast to the QCA output, this represents yet another case-based piece of evidence against the causal role of the time-pressured post-election period in producing coalition resemblance.

By contrast, the latter path presents a different configuration. Its causal link, however, should be questioned for two reasons. First, different tests either prompt substantial changes in the combinatorial composition of this final path or completely remove it from the results. Second, this is the only path that covers a deviant case in consistency for the sufficiency analysis.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, this case is the Balladares government in Panama in 1994. In theory, the case is not overly complicated: the pre-election alliance was composed

of rather small parties that failed to provide a legislative majority to the president-elect. Crucially, these parties *failed* to pass the electoral threshold and were later *incorporated* into the presidential party. In this context, the presidential party sought out another partner to consolidate the policy-making process of the future government, thereby making the post-election coalition cabinet look very different from the initial pre-election alliance. At the same time, it is unclear to what extent pre-election coalition partners influenced the post-election bargaining process. All of this suggests that we should be extremely cautious in drawing inferences from this last configuration.

## 7 Concluding Remarks

Thirty years ago, there was barely any study interested in examining how pre-election coalitions influence government formation processes, with the notable exception of [Strøm, Budge and Laver \(1994\)](#). Fortunately, the literature has undergone a tremendous shift, as a large body of research today is dedicated to studying the relationship between pre-electoral alliances and coalition formation, governance, and survival across different systems of government (e.g. [Ferrara and Herron, 2005](#); [Ibenskas, 2016](#); [Spoon and West, 2015](#)).

In presidential democracies, in particular, pre-election coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition governments, as executive-legislative relations derive from the independent election of the executive and the legislative branches. Against this backdrop, the main aim of this paper was to take a closer look at the process by which pre-electoral pacts become post-electoral coalitions in Latin American presidential democracies. *This was done especially from a more case-centric perspective on causality.* Instead of relying on conventional statistical methods, I subscribe to a configurational approach to study under which conditions post-electoral coalitions mirror their pre-electoral antecedents.

The findings suggest that a combination of contextual and institutional factors is required to understand the degree of stability between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. In varying ways, the seat share granted by pre-electoral coalition members, their alignment

on policy goals, the general ideological polarisation in the legislature and low presidential powers combine to explain the conversion of pre-electoral into post-electoral coalitions. More specifically, one of the pathways toward coalition resemblance is the combination of a majority seat share with congruent policy views from pre-election coalition partners. Other paths highlight constraints outside the boundaries of pre-election coalitions, such as an ideologically divided legislature and weak presidential powers. Importantly, the analysis reveals that no condition is individually sufficient to account for this process; rather, the explanation resides in the interplay among different factors.

As a consequence, three main takeaways can be retrieved from this work. First, pre-electoral coalition majority status clearly matters for post-electoral coalition formation, but only in combination with low ideological differences among pre-election coalition members. Second, the findings suggest that pre-election coalitions are not necessarily bound to dissipate in the post-electoral scenario if their members have significant differences in policy preferences. If the party system is characterised by irreconcilable policy divergences, then pre-election coalitions are well-positioned to serve as the foundation for the incoming government. While these two contributions further corroborate existing findings in the literature, this article also challenges current knowledge about coalition politics in presidential democracies more generally, and about the transformation of pre-election coalitions into multiparty governments in particular. More specifically, although presidential powers matter for the portfolio allocation process ([Silva, 2023](#)), I have found very limited support for the causal relevance of low presidential powers to the resemblance between pre- and post-election coalitions. More critically, case analysis shows even less evidence for the role of the institutional time constraint of presidential elections in shaping coalition resemblance. No matter how long the distance between the election results and the government's inauguration day, the cases covered in this study would most likely still have been based on their pre-election alliances.

While recent years have witnessed a wealth of research on pre-electoral coalitions, there still remains, of course, significant potential for further developments. Departing from this study, future research would greatly benefit from differentiating types of conversion

of pre-electoral coalitions into full-fledged coalition governments. In this paper, despite analysing the reasons behind the similarity between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, all changes in pre-electoral coalitions were treated as if they were equivalent to one another, though bringing in another party is very different from expelling a member from the alliance. As a consequence, the different changes that pre-electoral coalitions undergo between the pre- and post-electoral periods deserve closer attention in future research.

In addition, another potential avenue for future research is examining the translation of pre- to post-electoral coalitions from the perspective of within-case studies. This is especially the case in the literature on coalitional presidentialism, a field desperately in dire need of more qualitative studies. Despite adopting a case-oriented approach, the discussion here is bounded by the typical cross-case nature of QCA and confined to typical cases of each causal pathway. Moreover, this analysis features a limitation in not fully exploring the richness of QCA's different types of cases, each of which serves a specific purpose in causal explanations (Oana and Schneider, 2018). Thus, future case studies can be conducted to complement (or cast doubt on) this paper's findings.

Lastly, the coalition literature would be greatly enriched by case studies also conducted at the party level. While this paper has been limited to studying the multiparty aspect of pre-electoral coalitions, it is indisputable that intraparty tensions play a role in party fates. Even if coalition governments result from interparty bargaining, case studies on intraparty politics can help us better understand the processes by which pre-electoral coalitions are formed, expanded and dissolved, in some cases even before presidents are sworn into office.

## Notes

1. The original multiparty alliance was composed of two minor parties, namely the Vanguard Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR-V, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Vanguardia*) and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCML, *Partido Comunista Marrista Leninista*), besides the MIR itself. The ensuing coalition cabinet, however, was comprised of the MIR and the right-wing party Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista*).

2. The acronym INUS stands for Insufficient condition but still Necessary to an Unnecessary but Sufficient path towards explaining the outcome of interest (Mackie, 1965).
3. Causal complexity includes at least two other elements: equifinality and causal asymmetry. Due to space constraints, however, I limit the discussion here only to conjunctural causation, but further details can be found in standard textbooks on QCA, such as in Mello (2021, 64–68), Oana et al. (2021, 12–15), and Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 78–83).
4. I present some particularities of QCA in more detail in Section 2 of the Supplementary Material.
5. To illustrate the procedure in the case of coalition shrinkage, let us consider the formation of the Martinelli cabinet in Panama in 2009, in which a pre-electoral alliance of four parties resulted in a post-electoral coalition of only two parties. Initially, the pact was composed of the Democratic Change Party (PCD, *Partido Cambio Democrático*), the Panameñista Party (PPA, *Partido Panameñista*), the National Renewal Movement (MOLIRENA, *Movimiento de Renovación Nacional*), and the Patriotic Union (UP, *Unión Patriótica*). However, in the wake of the electoral process, the coalition was reduced to only two parties, namely the PCD and the PPA. To measure the extent to which the post-electoral cabinet resembles the pre-electoral alliance, I calculate the percentage of the PPA's share of seats relative to the combined share of seats of the MOLIRENA, the PPA, and the UP. Note that the legislative share of seats of the presidential party, the PCD, is not included in this calculation.
6. This line is deliberately drawn not to be at 0.4 to avoid placing the Dominican case, namely Medina II, on the maximum point of indifference. A calibration process resulting in instances with set value memberships of exactly 0.5 represents a grave pitfall in configurational comparative methods, thus being important to be circumvented. For more details, see Oana et al. (2021, Chap. 2).
7. To further leverage claims of necessity relations, the necessary disjunction, here composed of MAJ + HTEMP, should fit into a higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness and have few cases violating the necessity statement (Mello, 2021; Oana et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). This additional examination is available in Section 3 of the Supplementary Material and calls into question the existence of the necessary relation.
8. A raw data matrix and the ensuing calibrated data are available in the Supplementary Material.
9. Logical remainders are simply truth table rows devoid of empirical cases. Without a counterfactual analysis, these rows are not inserted into the minimisation process because it is impossible to calculate

their membership in the outcome given their missing empirical evidence.

10. For the differences between solution terms, see [Medina et al. \(2017, Chap. 2\)](#), [Mello \(2021, Chap. 7\)](#) and [Schneider and Wagemann \(2012, Chap. 6\)](#). Following good practices in the QCA literature, I report both conservative and parsimonious solutions in the Supplementary Material.
11. The XY Plot is available in Figure A.2 in the Supplementary Material.
12. For more on the discussion between approaches to cases and causality in configurational comparative methods, see [Haesebrouck and Thomann \(2022\)](#).
13. The XY Plot for sufficiency in the Supplementary Material also reveals that the results fail to explain the cases of Caldera and Macri. Despite the similarity between pre- and post-election coalitions, these cases are not exemplary of any causal pathway. Hence, they serve as perfect cases for an *a posteriori* in-depth analysis to complement or cast doubts on the arguments developed in this study.

## References

- Albala, Adrián.** “Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes.” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* **19** (2017): 735–754.
- Albala, Adrián.** “When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America.” *Politics* **41** (2021): 351–370.
- Albala, Adrián, André Borges and Lucas Couto.** “Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems.” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* **25** (2023): 64–82.
- Albala, Adrián, André Borges and Thiago N. Silva.** “From Ballots to Cabinets: Analyzing the Continuity Between Pre- and Post-Electoral Coalitions in Multi-party Presidential Democracies.” In Patrick Dumont, Bernard Grofman, Torbjörn Bergman, and Tom Louwerse (Eds.), *New Developments in the Study of Coalition Governments*. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024, 249–270.

- Albala, Adrián and Lucas Couto.** “Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes.” *Brazilian Political Science Review* **17** (2023): 1–28.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio.** “Cabinet formation in presidential regimes: An analysis of 10 latin american countries.” Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association in Illinois, 1998, 1–36.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio.** “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas.” *Comparative Political Studies* **39** (2006): 415–440.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio.** “Cabinets and coalitional presidentialism.” In Barry Ames (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Brazilian Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2019, 293–312.
- Araújo, Victor, Thiago Silva and Marcelo Vieira.** “Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing.” *Brazilian Political Science Review* **10** (2016).
- Ariotti, Margaret H. and Sona N. Golder.** “Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* **51** (2018): 341–379.
- Axelrod, Robert.** *Conflict of interest: a theory of divergent goals with applications to politics*. Chicago: Markham, 1970.
- Azevedo, Reinaldo.** “PR, PTB e PSC reavaliam apoio ao governo nesta terça.” <https://veja.abril.com.br/coluna/reinaldo/pr-ptb-e-psc-reavaliam-apoio-ao-governo-nesta-terca/>. 2012. Accessed 21 June 2022.
- Batista, Mariana.** “Power-Sharing, Presidential Style: Issue Salience and Portfolio Allocation in Multiparty Presidential Systems.” *Political Research Quarterly* **76** (2023): 915–930.
- Batista, Mariana, Timothy J Power and Cesar Zucco.** “Be careful what you wish for: Portfolio allocation, presidential popularity, and electoral payoffs to parties in multiparty presidentialism.” *Party Politics* **30** (2024): 622–636.
- Belén Sánchez, Ana Benito and Wilfredo Lozano.** “Clientelistic Stability and

- Institutional Fragility: The Political System in the Dominican Republic (1978-2010).” *Latin American Perspectives* **39** (2012): 198–211.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, Gisèle De Meur, Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin.** “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach.” In Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (Eds.), *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009, 1–18.
- Bergman, Matthew E., Mariyana Angelova, Hanna Bäck and Wolfgang C. Müller.** “Coalition agreements and governments’ policy-making productivity.” *West European Politics* **47** (2024): 31–60.
- Bersch, Katherine, Felix Lopez and Matthew M. Taylor.** “Patronage and Presidential Coalition Formation.” *Political Research Quarterly* **76** (2023): 508–523.
- Bertholini, Frederico and Carlos Pereira.** “Pagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileiro.” *Revista de Administração Pública* **51** (2017): 528–550.
- Borges, André.** “The Illusion of Electoral Stability: From Party System Erosion to Right-Wing Populism in Brazil.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* **13** (2021): 166–191.
- Borges, André, Adrian Albala and Lucia Burtnik.** “Pathways to Nationalization in Multilevel Presidential Systems: Accounting for Party Strategies in Brazil and Argentina.” *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* **47** (2017): 648–672.
- Borges, André, Ryan Lloyd and Gabriel Vommaro** (Eds.) *The Recasting of the Latin American Right: Polarization and Conservative Reactions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.
- Borges, André, Mathieu Turgeon and Adrián Albala.** “Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems.” *Party Politics* **27** (2021): 1279–1289.
- Brewer-Carías, Allan R.** *Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chávez Authoritarian Experiment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- Carroll, Royce.** “*The electoral origins of governing coalitions.*” Ph.D. thesis, University of California, San Diego, 2007.
- Chaisty, Paul, Nic Cheeseman and Timothy J. Power.** *Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Chasquetti, Daniel.** “Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en América Latina: evaluando la difícil combinación.” In Jorge Lanzaro (Ed.), *Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América Latina.* Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2001, 319–359.
- Cheibub, José Antônio.** *Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Couto, Lucas.** “Government formation in presidentialism: Disentangling the combined effects of pre-electoral coalitions and legislative polarization.” *Latin American Politics and Society* **67** (2025): 36–55.
- Crisp, Brian F.** “Presidential Behavior in a System with Strong Parties: Venezuela, 1958–1995.” In Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (Eds.), *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.* Cambridge University Press, 1997, 160–198.
- Dalton, Russell J.** “The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences.” *Comparative Political Studies* **41** (2008): 899–920.
- Doyle, David and Robert Elgie.** “Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power.” *British Journal of Political Science* **46** (2016): 731–741.
- Dusa, Adrian.** *QCA with R: A comprehensive resource.* Springer International Publishing, 2019.
- Ecker, Alejandro and Thomas M Meyer.** “The duration of government formation processes in Europe.” *Research and Politics* **2** (2015): 1–9.
- Fernandes, Jorge M., Florian Meinfelder and Catherine Moury.** “Wary Partners: Strategic Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* **49** (2016): 1270–1300.
- Ferrara, Federico and Erik S. Herron.** “Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under

- Mixed Electoral Rules.” *American Journal of Political Science* **49** (2005): 16–31.
- Freudenreich, Johannes.** “The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems.” *Latin American Politics and Society* **58** (2016): 80–102.
- Geddes, Barbara.** *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003.
- Golder, Sona N.** “Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process.” *Comparative Political Studies* **43** (2010): 3–32.
- Haesebrouck, Tim and Eva Thomann.** “Introduction: Causation, inferences, and solution types in configurational comparative methods.” *Quality and Quantity* **56** (2022): 1867–1888.
- Handlin, Samuel.** “Venezuela: Development of a Highly Polarizing Party System.” In *State Crisis in Fragile Democracies: Polarization and Political Regimes in South America*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 57–100.
- Hernández-Naranjo, Gerardo and Jesús Guzmán-Castillo.** “Diverse profiles within single-party cabinets: portfolio allocation in Costa Rica (1978-2014).” In Marcelo Camerlo and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo (Eds.), *Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets*. New York: Routledge, 2018, 48–66.
- Hunter, Wendy and Timothy J. Power.** “Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash.” *Journal of Democracy* **30** (2019): 68–82.
- Ibenskas, Raimondas.** “Understanding Pre-electoral Coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe.” *British Journal of Political Science* **46** (2016): 743–761.
- Ide, Tobias.** “Why do conflicts over scarce renewable resources turn violent? A qualitative comparative analysis.” *Global Environmental Change* **33** (2015): 61–70.
- Indridason, Indridi H.** “Coalition formation and polarisation: coalition formation and polarisation.” *European Journal of Political Research* **50** (2011): 689–718.
- Janzwood, Amy.** “Explaining Variation in Oil Sands Pipeline Projects.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* **53** (2020): 540–559.
- Kellam, Marisa.** “Parties for hire: How particularistic parties influence presidents’

- governing strategies.” *Party Politics* **21** (2015): 515–526.
- Kellam, Marisa.** “Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?” *British Journal of Political Science* **47** (2017): 391–411.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba.** *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Landau, David.** “Constituent power and constitution making in Latin America.” In David Landau and Hanna Lerner (Eds.), *Comparative Constitution Making*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, 567–588.
- Leiserson, Michael.** “*Coalitions in politics. a theoretical and empirical study.*” Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1966.
- Lopes, Amanda Vitoria.** “The Best of Two Worlds: Selection Strategies for Vice-Presidential Candidates.” *Brazilian Political Science Review* **16** (2022): e0001.
- Mackie, J. L.** “Causes and conditions.” *American Philosophical Quarterly* **2** (1965): 245–264.
- Marsteintredet, Leiv.** “The Constitutions of the Dominican Republic: Between Aspirations and Realities.” In Richard Albert, Derek O’Brien, and Se-shauna Wheatle (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Caribbean Constitutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 360–390.
- Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia.** “Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems?” *Comparative Political Studies* **45** (2012): 62–90.
- Medina, Ivan, Pablo José Castillo-Ortiz, Priscilla Álamos Concha and Benoît Rihoux.** *Análisis Cualitativo Comparado (QCA)*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2017.
- Meireles, Fernando.** “Política Distributiva em Coalizão.” *Dados* **67** (2024): 1–50.
- Mello, Patrick A.** *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: An Introduction to Research Design and Application*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021.
- Moury, Catherine.** *Coalition Government and Party Mandate How Coalition Agree-*

- ments Constrain Ministerial Action*. Routledge, 2013.
- Müller, Wolfgang C., Hanna Bäck and Johan Hellström.** “Coalition dynamics: advances in the study of the coalition life cycle.” *West European Politics* **47** (2024): 1–30.
- Naurin, Elin, Stuart Soroka and Niels Markwat.** “Asymmetric Accountability: An Experimental Investigation of Biases in Evaluations of Governments’ Election Pledges.” *Comparative Political Studies* **52** (2019): 2207–2234.
- Oana, Ioana-Elena and Carsten Q. Schneider.** “SetMethods: an Add-on R Package for Advanced QCA.” *The R Journal* **10** (2018): 507–533.
- Oana, Ioana-Elena and Carsten Q. Schneider.** “A Robustness Test Protocol for Applied QCA: Theory and R Software Application.” *Sociological Methods and Research* **53** (2024): 57–88.
- Oana, Ioana-Elena, Carsten Q. Schneider and Eva Thomann.** *Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using R: A Beginner’s Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Panbianco, Angelo.** *Political parties: organization and power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Pereira, Carlos, Frederico Bertholini and Marcus Melo.** “‘Congruent We Govern’: Cost of Governance in Multiparty Presidentialism.” *Government and Opposition* **58** (2023): 843–861.
- Ragin, Charles C.** *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- Ragin, Charles C. and John Sonnett.** “Limited diversity and counterfactual cases.” In Charles C. Ragin (Ed.), *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, 147–159.
- Raile, Eric D., Carlos Pereira and Timothy J. Power.** “The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime.” *Political Research Quarterly* **64** (2011): 323–334.
- Riker, William.** *The theory of political coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press,

1962.

**Rönkkö, Mikko, Markku Maula and Karl Wennberg.** “Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Entrepreneurship Research.” *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* (2025): 10422587251315654.

**Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart.** *Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

**Schneider, Carsten Q.** “Realists and Idealists in QCA.” *Political Analysis* **26** (2018): 246–254.

**Schneider, Carsten Q. and Ingo Rohlfing.** “Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research.” *Sociological Methods and Research* **42** (2013): 559–597.

**Schneider, Carsten Q and Claudius Wagemann.** *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

**Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey.** *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

**Silva, Thiago N.** “When do different systems of government lead to similar power-sharing? The case of government formation.” *Political Science Research and Methods* **11** (2023): 938–946.

**Silva, Thiago N. and Alejandro Medina.** “Policy Monitoring and Ministerial Survival: Evidence from a Multiparty Presidentialism.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* **48** (2023): 71–103.

**Skaaning, Svend-Erik.** “Assessing the Robustness of Crisp-set and Fuzzy-set QCA Results.” *Sociological Methods and Research* **40** (2011): 391–408.

**Spoon, Jae-Jae and Karleen Jones West.** “Alone or together? How institutions affect party entry in presidential elections in Europe and South America.” *Party Politics* **21** (2015): 393–403.

- Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver.** “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* **38** (1994): 303–335.
- Thijm, Joris and Jorge M. Fernandes.** “Parties and Coalition Governance in Presidential Democracies.” *Political Research Quarterly* **78** (2024): 481–494.
- Thijm, Joris Alberdingk.** “Coalition Governance under Separation of Powers: Shadowing by Committee in Coalitional Presidentialism.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* **49** (2024): 835–860.
- Viatkin, Iliia.** “Participation of populist radical right parties in coalition governments of Central and Eastern Europe: do national party systems matter?” *East European Politics* **39** (2023): 414–433.

Supplementary Material for “The Drivers of Resemblance in  
Presidential Regimes: explaining the conversion of pre-electoral  
coalitions into coalition cabinets”

Lucas Couto  
Aarhus University  
[lac@ps.au.dk](mailto:lac@ps.au.dk)

## Contents

<b>Section 1: Case Selection</b>	<b>OA2</b>
<b>Section 2: QCA in Details</b>	<b>OA3</b>
<b>Section 3: Assessing Necessity Relations: A Look Into Deviant Cases</b>	<b>OA4</b>
<b>Section 4: Raw Data Matrix and Calibrated Data</b>	<b>OA7</b>
<b>Section 5: Alternative Solutions for Coalition Resemblance</b>	<b>OA8</b>
<b>Section 6: Deviant Cases for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions</b>	<b>OA11</b>
<b>Section 7: Analysis for the non-Outcome</b>	<b>OA13</b>
<b>Section 8: Robustness Tests</b>	<b>OA13</b>
Case Selection	OA13
Alternative Thresholds in the Calibration Process	OA16
Cluster Analyses	OA18
Benchmark for Consistency	OA24
Summary	OA25

## Section 1: Case Selection

The focus of the article is on coalition cabinets preceded by pre-electoral coalitions in Latin American presidential democracies. Naturally, the delimitation of my case selection excludes several presidential cabinets from the analysis. Below, I present why some cases are not examined here.

To begin with, my case selection excludes coalition governments without any pre-electoral inception from the cases under consideration. To provide a couple of examples, in Colombia, Samper and Pastrana won their presidential elections without forming pre-electoral coalitions. This means that there is no pre-election alliance to which coalition cabinets can be compared. For this reason, these cases, and others with similar trajectories, are not analysed here.

Moreover, this work focuses exclusively on coalition governments and, as a consequence, single-party cabinets are also ruled out, even if the president-elect's party had committed to a multiparty pact prior to the elections. An example of this is the Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee (COPEI, *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*) prior to the 1978 Venezuelan presidential election. Even if the party had built a pre-electoral coalition with the Democratic Republican Union (URD, *Unión Republicana Democrática*), the alliance was ultimately dissolved, and the URD did not receive a single cabinet position in the COPEI administration. Similar cases, where pre-election coalitions were broken to give birth to single-party governments, are excluded from the analysis to ensure conceptual accuracy.

I also distinguish between *pre-electoral* and *electoral* alliances ([Allern and Aylott, 2009](#)), thereby leaving the latter out of the analysis at first. This is because electoral alliances are chiefly comprised of run-off agreements in presidential regimes, in which first-round losers provide support for one of the two main contestants left in the dispute ([Albala, 2021](#); [McClintock, 2018](#)). The point is that since talks take place amidst elections, run-off agreements do not fit precisely into the concept of *pre-electoral* coordination. Despite this, as scholarship on run-off agreements is still emergent and has

not tapped into how they influence the government formation process, I include electoral alliances made between the first and second rounds of presidential elections at a later stage in order to test the soundness of my results.

Lastly, since the main goal of the study is to capture the conversion of pre-election pacts into coalition cabinets, the analysis covers solely the first cabinet formed in each government. In the literature, these cabinets are also referred to as “Day One coalitions” (Chaisty et al., 2018), and are usually the analytical focus of empirical research (e.g. Albala et al., 2024; Thijm and Fernandes, 2024). In this way, even though the effects of pre-electoral pacts may surpass the first stage of coalition governments, as suggested by coalition theories (Albala et al., 2023; Chiru, 2015; Kellam, 2017), the long-lasting impacts of pre-electoral pacts on coalition governance and survival are out of this work’s length. In other words, my argument does not apply to cabinet reshuffles, and hence, I do not include them in the analysis.

## Section 2: QCA in Details

Some details of QCA merit further discussion. I present some of them in this section. To start, it is worthwhile to make clear that the calibration process is not enmeshed in probabilistic thinking (Ragin, 2008, Chap. 5; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 1). Set membership scores do not reveal the *probability* that cases have to belong to a set; instead, they reflect whether cases are (more) *in* or *out* of the reference set.

A closely related aspect is that cases are an instance (or not) of a set, which is, in turn, linked to an underlying concept. Consequently, set conceptualisation cannot be detached from the calibration process. Rather than referring to broad terms, sets have to mirror and be in accordance with the part of the concept which is of interest to the researcher (Goertz, 2020; Mello, 2021). Accordingly, besides the outcome of Coalition Resemblance (CR), I derive five conditions from my theoretical framework in the main text: Majority (MAJ), Low Within Polarisation (LWPOL), High Legislative Polarisation (HLPOL), High Temporal Constraint (HTEMP), and Low Presidential Power (LPP).

Furthermore, the scholarship on configurational comparative methods has developed different procedures to transform raw data into fuzzy sets. In the paper, I make use of the direct assignment and the direct method.<sup>1</sup> Table 2 in the main text makes transparent how each explanatory condition has been calibrated.

Finally, I explicitly mention the use of the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) in the main body of the text. I explain this decision here. In contrast to the Standard Analysis (SA), the ESA guarantees that untenable assumptions are not made during the Boolean minimisation, thereby preventing the counterfactual analysis from including logical remainder rows that would violate necessity claims in the analysis of sufficient conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Chap. 8). In the next section, I dispute the existence of the necessary disjunction (MAJ + HTEMP) in shaping the similarity between pre- and post-election coalitions. Despite this, I take a conservative approach and remove every counterfactual case that is based on the negation of this statement (i.e.,  $\sim\text{MAJ} * \sim\text{HTEMP}$ ) from the sufficiency analysis. I do so mainly to show that the main results in the paper do not stem from a potentially untenable assumption, should one reject my interpretation about the necessity claim below.

## Section 3: Assessing Necessity Relations: A Look Into Deviant Cases

In the main text, the results for the analysis of necessary conditions show that the combination of *Majority* and *High Temporal Constraint* is supposedly necessary to render *Coalition Resemblance*. To further investigate this statement, I now turn my attention to whether the two pieces of the necessary disjunction combine to form a higher-order concept and to inspect the number of deviant cases in kind in the relationship between the necessary disjunction and the outcome.

First, the literature strongly recommends integrating necessary disjunctions into a


---

<sup>1</sup>For more information on the extant calibration procedures and their differences, see Dusa (2019, Chap. 4) and Mello (2021, Chap. 5).

higher-order concept to ensure conceptual meaningfulness (Mello, 2021; Oana et al., 2021; Schneider, 2018). This is not troublesome here, as the alleged necessary conditions evoke the idea of a ‘convenient manoeuvre’ to the formation of coalition cabinets. The reasoning is that both a majority pre-election coalition and a short period until the president is sworn into office discourage the president-elect’s party from reformulating the pre-electoral alliance. In this regard, this represents a convenient means to hold together the pre-electoral coalition members until the post-electoral stage, either because the government is about to form a majority government or because there is little time to make significant changes to pre-electoral agreements.

Nevertheless, the literature also warns that the underlying set relation should not be fraught with deviant cases in kind in order to have a meaningful necessary relation (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). To inspect if this is the case here, Figure A.1 shows the XY plot between MAJ + HTEMP and the outcome CR.

Figure A.1: XY Plot for the Purported Necessary Disjunction



In set theory, necessity relations imply that (the combination of) conditions are a superset of the outcome. In a perfect set relation, this implies that all cases present in the outcome are also part of the condition set. As can be seen in Figure A.1, this is not precisely what happens with the data at hand—some cases contradict the statement of necessity.<sup>2</sup>

The first aspect to note is the existence of several deviant consistency cases in degree. Despite not being the most problematic deviance for necessity claims, they have higher score values in the outcome than in the disjunction set, thereby distorting the necessity relation. More remarkably and of particular interest here, two coalition cabinets represent deviant consistency cases in kind: the first government of Cardoso in Brazil in 1994 and the Moscoso minority government in Panama in 1999. In spite of having a considerable time until government inauguration or not holding a majority of seats in the legislature, both presidents still formed their respective post-electoral governments based on the multiparty bargaining that took place before the elections. In other words, these cases are *in* the outcome set but fall *outside* the disjunction set. Hence, they not only stand in contrast but also weaken the claim that the ‘convenient manoeuvre’ is necessary to produce post-electoral governments similar to the pre-electoral coalitions that originated them. Given this, even if the disjunction has substantial consistency, coverage and relevance scores, the statement that  $MAJ + HTEMP \leftarrow CR$  must be taken with a grain of salt. This caution should be reinforced, especially since these two cases appear in a causal recipe that is sensitive to specification changes, and subsequent case studies temper our confidence in one of the conditions included in the necessary disjunction. In this context, I refrain from considering the ‘convenient manoeuvre’ a necessary way to achieve *Coalition Resemblance*.

---

<sup>2</sup>There are a handful of different types of cases in QCA results. To understand their differences and, consequently, their position in an XY Plot, see [Oana and Schneider \(2018\)](#).

## Section 4: Raw Data Matrix and Calibrated Data

Table A.1: Raw Data Matrix

Cases	Government Status	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Lower Chamber (%)	PEC's Legislative Contingent in the Upper Chamber (%)	PEC's Within Polarisation	Legislative Polarisation	Temporal Constraint	Presidential Power	Coalition Resemblance
De La Rúa	Minority	46.3	29.1	1.267	3.262	47	0.407	1
Macri	Minority	33.85	19.44	1.256	3.894	18	0.407	1
Siles	Minority	33.84	37.03	2.087	4.155	23	0.289	0.807
Paz Zamora	Minority	25.38	29.62	0.599	3.803	91	0.289	0
Banzer	Minority	22.30	40.74	2.010	1.939	66	0.319	0.128
Cardoso I	Minority	35.28	40.74	1.850	3.150	90	0.486	0.530
Cardoso II	Minority	57.50	49.38	1.286	2.662	89	0.486	0.685
Lula I	Minority	25.14	20.98	2.795	3.225	66	0.486	0.299
Lula II	Minority	18.71	14.81	0.334	3.257	64	0.486	0.049
Rousseff I	Minority	60.42	59.26	2.969	3.333	62	0.486	0.860
Rousseff II	Minority	59.22	65.43	3.660	3.279	67	0.486	0.899
Aylwin	Minority	54.09	40.42	1.400	2.780	87	0.523	1
Frei	Minority	57.5	45.65	1.526	3.257	90	0.523	1
Lagos	Minority	57.5	48.97	1.312	3.002	55	0.523	1
Bachelet I	Minority	52.5	52.63	1.051	3.937	55	0.523	1
Piñera I	Minority	45.83	42.10	0.948	4.037	53	0.523	1
Bachelet II	Minority	52.5	50	1.847	3.906	86	0.523	1
Piñera II	Minority	46.45	44.18	1.047	4.298	84	0.523	1
Uribe II	Minority	40.49	56.86	1.956	3.746	71	0.381	0.822
Santos II	Minority	55.42	46.07	1.909	2.594	53	0.381	0.670
Medina II	Majority	66.84	90.62	0.244	1.174	62	0.400	1
Endara	Minority	82.2	Not Applicable	1.412	2.089	227	0.452	1
Balladares	Minority	44.66	Not Applicable	1.564	3.446	116	0.452	0.428
Moscoso	Minority	33.8	Not Applicable	0.755	3.615	122	0.452	1
Torrijos	Majority	55.33	Not Applicable	0.408	3.509	122	0.452	1
Martinelli	Minority	52.11	Not Applicable	1.192	3.657	59	0.452	0.785
Varela	Minority	23.93	Not Applicable	0.46	3.117	58	0.452	0.038
Cortizo	Minority	56.3	Not Applicable	1.224	2.841	57	0.452	1
Lusinchi	Majority	58	63.63	0.181	1.614	60	0.391	1
Caldera	Minority	24.63	22	3	2.337	59	0.391	1
Chávez	Minority	33.81	31.48	0.599	2.893	58	0.391	0.945

Table A.2: Calibrated Dataset

Cases	MAJ	LWPOL	HLPOL	HTEMP	LPP	CR
De La Rúa	0.6	0.89643	0.78123	0.98917	0.48450	1
Macri	0.2	0.89940	0.93728	1	0.48450	1
Siles	0.4	0.43630	0.96427	1	0.96277	0.807
Paz Zamora	0	0.98409	0.92401	0.015950	0.96277	0
Banzer	0.2	0.49263	0.13385	0.68679	0.91771	0.128
Cardoso I	0.4	0.60865	0.73482	0.019342	0.075123	0.53
Cardoso II	0.8	0.8911	0.47670	0.023439	0.075123	0.685
Lula I	0	0.08779	0.76658	0.68679	0.075123	0.299
Lula II	0	0.99264	0.77929	0.76454	0.075123	0.049
Rousseff I	1	0.054518	0.80747	0.82783	0.075123	0.86
Rousseff II	1	0.007481	0.78774	0.64310	0.075123	0.899
Aylwin	0.8	0.85404	0.54517	0.034322	0.025153	1
Frei	0.8	0.80149	0.77929	0.019342	0.025153	1
Lagos	0.8	0.8834	0.66463	0.95	0.025153	1
Bachelet I	1	0.94236	0.94277	0.95	0.025153	1
Piñera I	0.6	0.95679	0.95383	0.96567	0.025153	1
Bachelet II	1	0.61075	0.93886	0.041457	0.025153	1
Piñera II	0.6	0.94300	0.97390	0.060191	0.025153	1
Uribe II	0.8	0.53234	0.91444	0.45108	0.66217	0.822
Santos II	0.8	0.56658	0.43534	0.96567	0.66217	0.67
Medina II	1	0.99435	0.023104	0.82783	0.53499	1
Endara	1	0.84958	0.18254	0	0.18896	1
Balladares	0.4	0.78309	0.84417	0.00011	0.18896	0.428
Moscoso	0.2	0.97505	0.88819	0	0.18896	1
Torrijos	1	0.99087	0.86204	0	0.18896	1
Martinelli	1	0.915	0.89729	0.89653	0.18896	0.785
Varela	0	0.9893	0.72000	0.91337	0.18896	0.038
Cortizo	1	0.90761	0.57916	0.92769	0.18896	1
Lusinchi	1	0.9953	0.065087	0.87685	0.59690	1
Caldera	0	0.050000	0.29096	0.89653	0.59690	1
Chávez	0	0.98409	0.60757	0.91337	0.59690	0.945

## Section 5: Alternative Solutions for Coalition Resemblance

The alternative solutions for the outcome (*Coalition Resemblance*) result in model ambiguity, for which more than one solution formula is achieved in the minimisation process. This notwithstanding, the overall findings reported in the main text are not violated. Notably, such ambiguity disappears when I make use of directional expectations. Regardless, the different paths are listed below.

Table A.3: Conservative Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
$\sim$ MAJ*HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.942	0.919	0.135	0.035	Chavez, Siles
MAJ*LWPOL*HLPOL* $\sim$ HTEMP	0.999	0.999	0.260	0.010	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ*LWPOL* $\sim$ HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.984	0.980	0.303	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Cardoso II Endara, Frei, Pinera II, Torrijos
LWPOL*HLPOL* $\sim$ HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
MAJ*LWPOL* $\sim$ HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.975	0.965	0.117	0.044	Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos II
First model					
$\sim$ MAJ* $\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.845	0.739	0.093	0	Lula I; Siles
MAJ*HLPOL*HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.996	0.995	0.285	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Second model					
MAJ*LWPOL*HLPOL* $\sim$ LPP	0.997	0.997	0.428	0	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Frei, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Torrijos
$\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.901	0.853	0.153	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Third model					
MAJ*HLPOL*HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.996	0.995	0.285	0	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
$\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.901	0.853	0.153	0	Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II
Solution	0.926	0.912	0.732		


Table A.4: Enhanced Parsimonious Solution for Coalition Resemblance

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ	0.958	0.952	0.736	0.300	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Piñera I, Piñera II, Rouseff I, Rouseff II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
LWPOL*HLPOL*~HTEMP*~LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.046	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
First model					
~LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II, Siles
LWPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.902	0.872	0.215	0	Chavez, Lusinchi, Medina II, Santos
Second model					
~LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.916	0.877	0.186	0	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II, Siles
HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Third model					
~LWPOL*HTEMP*~LPP	0.904	0.860	0.159	0.005	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.010	Chavez, Siles
Solution 1	0.900	0.886	0.854		
Solution 2	0.907	0.893	0.865		
Solution 3	0.907	0.894	0.869		

## Section 6: Deviant Cases for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

The XY Plot in Figure A.2 shows that the solution formula fails to explain a few cases: Balladares in Panama, Caldera in Venezuela, and Macri in Argentina. The case of Balladares scores high in the set membership of the solution formula but is not representative of *Coalition Resemblance*. This is a typical false positive in a QCA study. By contrast, the cases of Caldera and Macri are false negatives: their pre-election coalitions served as the basis for coalition cabinets, yet the solution formula does not account for their emergence. While I return to the discussion of the case of Balladares in the section ‘Discussion and Case Studies’ in the main text, I briefly touch on Caldera and Macri cabinets below.

Figure A.2: XY Plot for the Analysis of Sufficient Conditions



The Caldera government was built on a rather unusual pre-election alliance between the National Convergence (CN, *Convergencia Nacional*) and the left-wing Movement to

ward Socialism (MAS, *Movimiento al Socialismo*). On the one hand, the CN was a direct splinter from the prevailing Punto Fijo system, and more significantly, Caldera himself was one of the founding fathers of this consensual pact (Caldera, 1999). On the other hand, MAS held a critical view of the traditional two-party system (Trinkunas, 2002). Even though the pre-election alliance secured only a minority of seats in the legislature, Caldera purposefully built his cabinet only around this alliance. The reason for this was his strategy to distance the government from the two mainstream parties and to govern through *ad hoc* coalitions (Coppedge, 1994). As a result, inviting the Democratic Action (AD, *Acción Democrática*) and the COPEI to join the cabinet was out of the question. Part of this strategy involved forming legislative coalitions with The Radical Cause (LCR, *La Causa Radical*), but intraparty disagreements within the LCR prevented it from providing support for government initiatives (Handlin, 2017). Overall, the political landscape in Venezuela imposed several restrictions on the government formation process after the 1993 elections. Though the Caldera government is not covered by the results in the main body of the paper, these constraints illustrate a common pathway to similarity between pre- and post-election coalitions: the broader context in which parties are embedded can restrict coalition bargaining. As discussed in the main text, a similar dynamic was crucial for governments in Brazil to rely on their pre-electoral commitments.

In contrast, the Macri government was based on an ideologically coherent pre-election alliance of right-wing parties. The case of Macri would have been an example of the first path, had it not been for a crucial missing characteristic: the pre-election alliance failed to provide a majority for the government. Nevertheless, a formal alliance with Peronist parties, especially with Kirchnerist Peronism, would go a long way toward tarnishing Macri and the Republican Proposal's (PRO, *Propuesta Republicana*) ideological brand. As a result, the government's policy-making process was made possible due to several defections from the Peronist movement (Vommaro, 2019). In fact, most of these defections did not come from ideological turnarounds, but rather from presidential influence over the transfer of resources to provinces (Murillo and Levitsky, 2019). Most importantly, this allowed the government to implement part of its policy agenda without incurring

the public cost of governing with Peronist parties. In any case, the results fall just short of fully explaining the Macri government. Yet, this is another cabinet in which the external environment was pivotal in shaping a coalition cabinet in a similar fashion to its antecedent pre-election coalition.

## Section 7: Analysis for the non-Outcome

Table A.5: Necessity Test for the non-Outcome

Disjunction	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
$\sim\text{MAJ} + \sim\text{LWPOL}$	0.955	0.426	0.625
$\sim\text{MAJ} + \text{LPP}$	0.967	0.422	0.613

Table A.6: Intermediate Solution for the non-Outcome

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
$\sim\text{MAJ} * \sim\text{HTEMP} * \text{LPP}$	0.815	0.717	0.300		Paz Zamora
Solution	0.815	0.717	0.300		

## Section 8: Robustness Tests

In this section, I conduct a series of tests to determine to what extent the results reported in the main text are robust. Taken together, they involve (a) changing the set of cases under analysis, (b) altering the parameters of the calibration process, (c) performing a wide array of cluster analyses, and (d) modifying the consistency benchmark of the analysis of sufficient conditions. Collectively, this constellation of tests offers useful tools to assess the validity of the main findings.

### Case Selection

Initially, the case selection rests on both majority and minority governments. This is so because the aim is to identify patterns in why pre-electoral coalitions retain most of their partners as they transition into coalition cabinets, regardless of the presidential

party's seat share. However, most studies on coalition governments opt to focus on minority presidents (e.g. [Freudenreich, 2016](#)). The justification lies in the fact that majority governments face different incentives in the government formation process than minority ones. Following this trend, I thereby exclude Lusinchi, Medina II, and Torrijos cases from the empirical analysis.

Furthermore, most governments initiate a few months after the election results are known. However, the Siles government deviated from the norm, as a military coup prevented the government from taking office for roughly two years ([Archondo Quiroga and Siles Ormachea, 2022](#)). For this reason, I also disregard Siles' coalition cabinet in this first test.

I also alter the set membership score of Balladares in *Coalition Resemblance* from 0.428 to 0. I do so because the presidential party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD, *Partido Revolucionario Democrático*), absorbed other pre-election coalition partners after they failed to pass the electoral threshold and, as such, lost their representation in the legislature ([Rodríguez Mójica, 2000](#)). Since parties no longer exist as separate entities from the *formateur* party, the extent to which pre-election partners influence the governing coalition is debatable, thus providing reasons for further investigation.

Finally, as mentioned in the main body of the paper and the first section of this Supplementary Material, the cornerstone of the study is *pre-electoral* alliances rather than purely *electoral* alliances. As such, coalitions derived from run-off agreements have remained out of the scope of the primary analysis. To assess whether their inclusion would somehow substantially change the findings, I input the Uruguayan cases into the dataset since the Colorado Party (PC, *Partido Colorado*) and the National Party (PN, *Partido Nacional*) have historically launched their own candidates for presidential elections but chosen to support each other's candidature in second rounds ([Albala, 2013](#)).<sup>3</sup> This results

---

<sup>3</sup>The 2019 and 2024 Uruguayan presidential elections gave rise to strikingly similar electoral movements. In both instances, the PC supported the PN's presidential candidates, Lacalle Pou and Delgado, in the run-off elections in 2019 and 2024, respectively. On these occasions, however, other parties, such as the Open Cabildo (CA, *Cabildo Abierto*) and the Independent Party (PI, *Partido Independiente*), also coalesced with the PN after each first round.

in including Batlle and Lacalle Pou coalition cabinets in the analysis.

Table A.7 shows the results after this reshaped case selection. The main difference is that Path 4 drops from the QCA table. A minor deviation also arises by possible alternatives for Path 2 and Path 3. However, this is due to the fact that Path 2 only covers cases from a single country and Path 3 only refers to a single case. Overall, except for the fourth configuration, the results yield the same pathways as those reported in the main text.

Table A.7: Robustness Test: Case Selection

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.948	0.941	0.598	0.480	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Batlle, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Frei, Lacalle Pou, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Uribe II
~LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.905	0.862	0.179	0.070	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.950	0.928	0.174	0.043	Chavez
Alternatively					
MAJ*LWPOL	0.948	0.941	0.598	0.480	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Batlle, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Frei, Lacalle Pou, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Uribe II
~LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP ~LPP	0.900	0.853	0.168	0.085	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
LWPOL *HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.946	0.921	0.159	0.043	Chavez
Solution	0.925	0.913	0.734		

Next, I test the degree to which the findings are sensitive to removing every Chilean case from the analysis. The reason for this is the prevalence of the *cuoteo* in governments in Chile since the redemocratisation. The *cuoteo* is an informal institution with a self-reinforcing character in which coalition partners coordinate political nominations to top office positions in the government, extending across both national and subnational levels (Siavelis et al., 2022). In this context, we can intuit that the existence of the *cuoteo* makes coalition resemblance between full-fledged coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral origins much more likely. On this basis, Table A.8 casts light on whether the configurations found

in the main application are primarily driven by the Chilean cases.

Table A.8: Robustness Test: Removal of Chilean Cases

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ * LWPOL	0.968	0.959	0.572	0.206	Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rúa, Endara, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ * HLPOL * HTEMP	0.978	0.970	0.305	0.077	Cortizo, De La Rúa, Martinelli, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP	0.927	0.896	0.266	0.085	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL * HLPOL * ~HTEMP * ~LPP	0.860	0.776	0.256	0.046	Balladares, Cardoso I, Moscoso, Torrijos
Solution	0.914	0.895	0.803		

Reassuringly, removing the Chilean cases from the analysis does not significantly alter the results. Most importantly, the first pathway (MAJ \* LWPOL) is virtually unchanged from the one reported in the main text. Although the first path in the original analysis explains every post-election coalition cabinet in Chile, the combination of majority status in the legislature and few policy differences not only explains most cases in this application but still obtains good parameters of fit. The main modification, in reality, happens in the second pathway (MAJ \* HLPOL \* HTEMP), in which the first condition replaces the policy tensions among pre-election coalition partners. However, this comes mostly from the impoverishment of the underlying vector space rather than from a causally relevant role of coalition size in this path.<sup>4</sup> In summary, this test provides strong evidence that the results are neither driven by coalition governments from Chile, in general, nor by the *cuoteo*, in particular.

## Alternative Thresholds in the Calibration Process

In the next test, I feed the minimisation process with slightly different rules for the calibration process. More specifically, I modify the parameters for inclusion and exclusion in HLPOL, HTEMP, and LPP by adjusting the scores for full membership, the cross-over

<sup>4</sup>See also the discussion about the causal relevance of the second path in the main text.

point, and full exclusion.

To begin with *High Legislative Polarisation*, I now set the cross-over point at 3.0 and full exclusion at 2.0, contrasting with the former 2.7 and 1.5 benchmark values, respectively. As countries scoring 4.0 in Dalton’s Polarisation Index are deemed to have highly polarised party systems, there is no reason to change the benchmark for full membership in the HLPOL set.

For *High Temporal Constraint*, the full exclusion is increased in a few days, namely from 85 to 92 days. Moreover, the cross-over point is lowered from 70 days to 61 days, reflecting a distinction between *formateurs* who have more than two months to renegotiate their multiparty agreements and those who do not. As mentioned in the main text, the cross-over point is not raised because the 70-day mark is paramount to distinguishing elections won in the first round from those that went to the distance in the second round for countries that adopt a presidential two-round system.

Finally, I lower the cross-over point from 0.405 to 0.399 and increase the value for being entirely out of *Low Presidential Powers* from 0.5 to 0.6. The first modification reflects the traditionally strong presidential powers in the Dominican Republic and examines whether Medina II substantially affects the findings if it were considered to be marginally outside of the target set. The second change concentrates on the set membership of Chilean cases. Chile is often described as a “hyper-presidential” democracy, where presidents hold disproportional constitutional powers vis-à-vis the legislature, leaving the latter with little influence over the policy-making process (e.g. [Eyzaguirre et al., 2020](#)). Recent studies, however, have challenged this view and claimed that presidents are not solely responsible for legislation in the country (e.g. [Berbecel, 2022](#); [Martínez and Dockendorff, 2023](#); [Mimica and Navia, 2024](#)). To do justice to this recent literature, I thus slightly adjust the threshold for full exclusion from LPP.

Results for the above modifications are shown in Table [A.9](#). Together, these changes prompt marginal modifications compared to the results presented in the main text. While Path 1 and Path 2 are very similar to those in Table 5 in the main text, Path 3 emerges

as a novelty, though the coverage of a deviant case in kind (Caldera) suggests that we should approach this combination with care. What is important is that *High Temporal Constraint* only appears in paths plagued by model ambiguity, where causal interpretation rests on a fragile basis (Oana et al., 2021). Together with the qualitative discussion in the main text, this provides additional evidence that the institutional argument for the importance of the time restriction separating elections from presidents’ inaugural day in office warrants due scepticism.

Table A.9: Robustness Test: Alternative Calibration Rules


	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.466	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
$\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL* $\sim$ LPP	0.927	0.885	0.199	0.044	Lula I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
$\sim$ LWPOL* $\sim$ HLPOL*LPP	0.901	0.828	0.151	0	Banzer, Caldera
$\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.972	0.952	0.144	0	Siles
Second model					
$\sim$ LWPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.931	0.887	0.154	0	Caldera, Siles
Alternatively					
First model					
$\sim$ MAJ* $\sim$ LWPOL*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.956	0.915	0.090	0	Siles
Second model					
$\sim$ MAJ* $\sim$ LWPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.905	0.848	0.109	0	Caldera; Siles
Solution	0.945	0.936	0.721		

## Cluster Analyses

I now examine whether plausible alternative explanations are missing in my theoretical framework. Typically, the literature suggests exploring how changing the explanatory conditions might change the results at hand (Ide, 2015). However, except for the temporal boundness argument, a hitherto barely tested claim, all conditions have solid theoretical roots. Hence, excluding a condition from the analysis appears to be a fruitless exercise. Nonetheless, the cases under analysis are clustered in several different ways. Under these

circumstances, we naturally have reasons to suspect the validity of the findings. This concern is graphically illustrated in Figure A.3.

Figure A.3: Causal Chain toward Coalition Resemblance



Note: Causal chain to explain the resemblance between full-blown coalition cabinets and their pre-electoral predecessors. Some institutional features mostly affect the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. Crucially, however, we should be cautious with institutions that influence the conversion of pre-electoral pacts into coalition cabinets.

Previous studies have pointed out that institutional designs influence the formation of pre-election coalitions (Kellam, 2017; Spoon and West, 2015). For current purposes, the key point is that some contextual conditions might be causally affected by the underlying institutional setup. For example, proportional systems are associated with higher political polarisation at the party system level (Dalton, 2021). Additionally, other existing institutions may facilitate or hinder the transformation of pre-election coalitions into coalition cabinets. Particularly important are the prior organisation of coalition primaries and the simultaneity of elections at different levels. Below, I then run four cluster analyses to identify whether substantial differences exist across subgroups.

I begin by considering the possible implications of underlying differing electoral rules across cases. As previously elaborated, electoral systems are a prime example of Figure A.3. This is worrying because the causal relevance of HLPOL might vanish when different electoral systems are taken into account. To see if this is the case, I source data from Bormann and Golder (2022) and run a cluster analysis on electoral rules. The results are shown in Table A.10 and corroborate the main findings by exhibiting minor deviations

between the pooled consistency scores and those from each electoral rule.

Table A.10: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Electoral Rules

Parameters of Fit		Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ *	MAJ *	HLPOL *	LWPOL *	
	LWPOL	HLPOL *	HTEMP *	HLPOL *	
		HTEMP	LPP	~HTEMP *	
				~LPP	
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912	
Between Mixed Electoral Systems (10)	0.955	0.991	0.901	0.868	
Between Proportional Electoral Systems (21)	0.989	0.905	0.942	0.939	
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.013	0.032	0.016	0.028	
Coverages					
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307	
Between Mixed Electoral Systems (10)	0.582	0.085	0.196	0.364	
Between Proportional Electoral Systems (21)	0.637	0.231	0.195	0.282	

Second, in my empirical investigation, coalition cabinets also differ with regard to primaries. These elections refer to shared procedures to choose the future presidential candidate among pre-election coalition members. Despite a wide variability of formal and informal arrangements, party primaries, in general, are regrettably still understudied in comparative research ([Sandri and Seddone, 2016](#)). To show a running example of this variability, in Latin America, party primaries are mandatory, and thus indispensable, for every meaningful party in Argentina. In stark contrast, there is no regulation in most other countries in the region, and the party primaries are left to the parties' discretion. Of particular relevance is that pre-electoral coalitions are, on average, more likely to hold primaries to select the identity of the presidential nominee in Latin America ([Kemahlioglu et al., 2009](#)).

Here, the main concern is whether coalition primaries plausibly make coalition cabinets more likely to resemble their pre-election composition. Theoretically, there is reason to believe that this could happen due to the heightened costs of forming pre-electoral coalitions under these circumstances and the fear of backlash by not inviting pre-election coalition members to the government after the presidential victory. First, by shifting the candidate selection mechanism from elites to voters, parties do not know if their candidate will feature on the presidential ballot. As a result, to reduce the costs of pre-election coalition formation, parties may be more willing to keep their word and avoid making future collaborations more difficult. Second, presidential parties risk alienating the orig-

inal pool of primary voters by disassembling the pre-electoral coalition after a successful presidential election. That said, in the wake of his presidential election win in Argentina in 2015, Macri publicly announced that his party, the Republican Proposal (PRO, *Propuesta Republicana*), would not form a coalition government with its pre-election coalition partner, the Radical Civic Union (UCR, *Unión Cívica Radical*), despite eventually doing so (Vommaro and Gené, 2017). Interestingly, this public declaration happened even though the PRO and the UCR had held primary elections together a few months prior to the presidential election.

To gain insights about whether coalition primaries cast doubt over the paper’s main findings, Table A.11 shows the results of a cluster analysis aimed at pinpointing differences across subgroups of pre-election coalitions based on the undertaking of coalition primaries. Again, the main results remain robust: none of the four pathways yields any systematic differences when clustering on coalition primaries and the distances between subgroups to the pooled consistency scores are minimal.

Table A.11: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Coalition Primaries

Parameters of Fit	Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ * LWPOL	MAJ * HLPOL * HTEMP	HLPOL * HTEMP * LPP	LWPOL * HLPOL * ~HTEMP * ~LPP
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Cases without Inter-Party Primaries (25)	0.973	0.907	0.910	0.875
Between Cases Preceded by Inter-Party Primaries (6)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.011	0.034	0.033	0.047
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Cases without Inter-Party Primaries (25)	0.626	0.224	0.201	0.276
Between Cases Preceded by Inter-Party Primaries (6)	0.602	0.073	0.177	0.398

The third test examines whether the previously set out explanatory conditions should be called into question. However, as mentioned before, excluding a condition from the analysis seems rather unproductive. Nonetheless, another condition could be inserted into the QCA analysis: the concurrence of national and legislative elections.

Extant studies have elaborated on how parties coordinate strategies across different electoral levels, refraining from maximising their utility in one dispute to leverage their

gains in the other(s) (Alves, 2023; Borges, 2019; Borges et al., 2017; Borges and Turgeon, 2019). By doing so, the probability that pre-electoral coalition members will not enjoy post-electoral perks should diminish considerably as the costs of coalition participation become apparent even before the elections occur. This, in turn, should make the government more reticent to withhold ministerial portfolios from pre-election coalition members accordingly. Hence, theoretically, a set labelled Concurrence Elections (CE) should be derived, and the necessary and sufficiency tests should be re-run. Nevertheless, very few cases did not have concomitant elections,<sup>5</sup> namely Lagos in Chile, Uribe II and Santos II in Colombia, and Chávez in Venezuela. With few instances belonging to the CE set, the necessary and sufficiency analyses would mainly become meaningless. As a result, I prefer to perform yet another cluster analysis to assess whether the difference engendered by not having concurrent elections changes the results in a significant way. Table A.12 summarises the results of this test. Again, cluster diagnostics produce no meaningful consistency differences between subgroups and pooled results.

Table A.12: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Concurrent Elections

Parameters of Fit		Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ *	~LWPOL *	HLPOL *	LWPOL *	
	LWPOL	HLPOL *	HTEMP *	HLPOL *	
		HTEMP	LPP	~HTEMP *	
				~LPP	
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912	
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.976	0.894	0.899	0.906	
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.009	0.04	0.038	0.035	
Coverages					
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307	
Between Cases without Concurrent Elections (4)	0.552	0.296	0.439	0.148	
Between Cases with Concurrent Elections (27)	0.632	0.168	0.154	0.334	

Finally, my sample consists of coalition governments nested in eight countries. To rule out the possibility that some pathways are driven by a particular set of countries, I perform a last cluster diagnostic analysis at the country level. Table A.13 provides strong evidence that the findings in the main body of the paper are not dependent on any given country.

<sup>5</sup>Notwithstanding the occurrence of midterm elections in some countries, such as Argentina, the vast majority of presidential elections are still held simultaneously with elections for the legislative branch.

Table A.13: Robustness Test: Cluster Analysis on Country

Parameters of Fit	Pathways			
Consistencies	MAJ *	~LWPOL *	HLPOL *	LWPOL *
	LWPOL	HLPOL *	HTEMP *	HLPOL *
		HTEMP	LPP	~HTEMP *
				~LPP
Pooled	0.979	0.916	0.929	0.912
Between Argentina (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Bolivia (3)	0.880	0.969	0.840	0.689
Between Brazil (6)	0.909	0.823	0.924	0.820
Between Chile (7)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Colombia (2)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Dom. Republic (1)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Between Panamá (7)	0.969	1.000	0.734	0.858
Between Venezuela (3)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Distance from Between to Pooled	0.017	0.021	0.035	0.043
Coverages				
Pooled	0.620	0.186	0.195	0.307
Between Argentina (2)	0.400	0.102	0.485	0.005
Between Bolivia (3)	0.565	0.740	1.000	0.088
Between Brazil (6)	0.345	0.542	0.095	0.363
Between Chile (7)	0.736	0.053	0.024	0.430
Between Colombia (2)	0.737	0.593	0.594	0.249
Between Dom. Republic (1)	0.994	0.006	0.023	0.023
Between Panamá (7)	0.787	0.036	0.079	0.466
Between Venezuela (3)	0.338	0.106	0.324	0.068

## Benchmark for Consistency

In a final test, the consistency threshold is raised first from 0.80 to 0.85, and then to 0.9. This prompts a few modifications, such as the replacement of  $\sim$ LWPOL for MAJ in the second path in Table A.14, and the collapse of a path in Table A.15. This notwithstanding, the broader picture remains the same: *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation* remain jointly important in bringing about the outcome through different paths.

Table A.14: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.85

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.163	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.985	0.981	0.314	0.054	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.060	Chavez, Siles
LWPOL*HLPOL* $\sim$ HTEMP* $\sim$ LPP	0.912	0.885	0.307	0.047	Aylwin, Bachelet II, Balladares, Cardoso I, Frei, Moscoso, Pinera II, Torrijos
Solution	0.937	0.927	0.798		

Table A.15: Robustness Test: Consistency Threshold of 0.9

	Consistency	PRI	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
MAJ*LWPOL	0.979	0.975	0.620	0.364	Aylwin, Bachelet I, Bachelet II, Cardoso II, Cortizo, De La Rua, Endara, Frei, Lagos, Lusinchi, Martinelli, Medina II, Pinera I, Pinera II, Santos II, Torrijos, Uribe II
MAJ*HLPOL*HTEMP	0.985	0.981	0.314	0.054	Bachelet I, Cortizo, De La Rua, Lagos, Martinelli, Pinera I, Rouseff I, Rouseff II
HLPOL*HTEMP*LPP	0.929	0.901	0.195	0.073	Chavez, Siles
Solution	0.964	0.958	0.751		

## Summary

Though a few differences arise, the results found in the original analysis are largely robust to several different specifications and diagnostic tools. In particular, a different case selection, an extensive array of cluster analyses, the use of different calibration criteria, and more stringent consistency benchmarks substantiate the importance of *Majority*, *Low Within Polarisation*, and *High Legislative Polarisation* as causally relevant conditions for explaining the high degree of resemblance between pre-election and post-election coalition arrangements.

Conversely,  $\sim$ LWPOL has proven to be somewhat sensitive to alternative procedures. This condition drops out of the second pathway when removing Chilean coalition cabinets from the analysis and when raising the consistency benchmark to 0.85 and 0.9. Yet, case-level knowledge informs us that the cases covered by this path in the main application – Lula I, Rousseff I, Rousseff II, and Siles – were recognised by policy divergences among their members. Despite the focus on Rousseff I and Rousseff II in the main text, Lula I featured an unprecedented agreement before the elections between left-wing parties and a right-of-centre party (Carreirão, 2004). Moreover, ideological differences between moderate and extremist left-wing party organisations afflicted Siles’ pre-election arrangement in the first civilian government after democratic restoration in Bolivia (Dunkerley, 1990). The key consideration is that pre-electoral coalitions still served as the centrepiece for post-electoral governments in these cases. Hence, since the results of QCA analysis should not be assessed at face value but rather interpreted through the lens of case analysis (Rönkkö et al., 2025; Rutten, 2024), I caution against outright dismissal of heterogeneous ideological preferences within pre-election coalition arrangements as their combination with high party system polarisation is one of the pathways toward coalition resemblance in multiparty presidential democracies in Latin America.

To conclude, HTEMP loses ground when alternative calibration decisions are applied. Crucially, a case-oriented view shows that the counterfactual world of low temporal constraint would have done little to change the post-election composition of the

governments discussed in the last paragraph. For instance, considering that Siles' party, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of the Left (MNRI, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda*), is a splinter from the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*) (Alexander, 1985) and that the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista*) is a direct descendant of the former dictatorial regime (Dunkerley, 1986), the chances of government membership for either party were, at best, very slim, regardless of the available period for the government formation process. In this context, the robustness tests, in combination with a bottom-up case-oriented perspective, point toward discrediting the role of *High Temporal Constraint* for coalition resemblance.

## References

- Albala, Adrián.** “Coalitions gouvernementales et système présidentiel: Les cas de l’argentine, du chili et de l’uruguay (1989-2010).” Ph.D. thesis, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, 2013.
- Albala, Adrián.** “When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America.” *Politics* **41** (2021): 351–370.
- Albala, Adrián, André Borges and Lucas Couto.** “Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems.” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* **25** (2023): 64–82.
- Albala, Adrián, Paula Clerici and Alejandro Olivares.** “Determinants of the cabinet size in presidential systems.” *Governance* **37** (2024): 771–784.
- Alexander, Robert J.** “Bolivia’s Democratic Experiment.” *Current History* **84** (1985): 73–87.
- Allern, Elin H. and Nicholas Aylott.** “Overcoming the fear of commitment: Pre-electoral coalitions in Norway and Sweden.” *Acta Politica* **44** (2009): 259–285.
- Alves, Vinícius Silva.** “Vale quanto pesa? A influência das eleições de governador sobre

- a composição da Câmara dos Deputados no Brasil (1994-2018).” *Opinião Pública* **29** (2023): 761–791.
- Archondo Quiroga, Rafael and Isabel Siles Ormachea.** *Sobre un barril de pólvora: biografía de Hernán Siles Zuazo*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2022.
- Berbecel, Dan.** *Presidential Power in Latin America: Examining the Cases of Argentina and Chile*. New York: Routledge, 2022.
- Borges, André.** “Razões da Fragmentação: Coligações e Estratégias Partidárias na Presença de Eleições Majoritárias e Proporcionais Simultâneas.” *Dados* **62** (2019): 1–37.
- Borges, André, Adrian Albala and Lucia Burtnik.** “Pathways to Nationalization in Multilevel Presidential Systems: Accounting for Party Strategies in Brazil and Argentina.” *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* **47** (2017): 648–672.
- Borges, André and Mathieu Turgeon.** “Presidential coattails in coalitional presidentialism.” *Party Politics* **25** (2019): 192–202.
- Bormann, Nils-Christian and Matt Golder.** “Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946–2020.” *Electoral Studies* **78** (2022): 102487.
- Caldera, Rafael.** *De Carabobo a Puntofijo: los causahabientes*. Caracas: Panapo, 1999.
- Carreirão, Yan.** “A eleição presidencial de 2002: uma análise preliminar do processo e dos resultados eleitorais.” *Revista de Sociologia e Política* (2004): 179–194.
- Chaisty, Paul, Nic Cheeseman and Timothy J. Power.** *Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Chiru, Mihail.** “Early Marriages Last Longer: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Government Survival in Europe.” *Government and Opposition* **50** (2015): 165–188.
- Coppedge, Michael.** “Prospects for Democratic Governability in Venezuela.” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* **36** (1994): 39–64.

- Dalton, Russell J.** “Modeling ideological polarization in democratic party systems.” *Electoral Studies* **72** (2021): 102346.
- Dunkerley, James.** “Bolivia at the Crossroads.” *Third World Quarterly* **8** (1986): 137–150.
- Dunkerley, James.** *Political Transition and Economic Stabilisation: Bolivia, 1982–1989*. London: ILAS, 1990.
- Dusa, Adrian.** *QCA with R: A comprehensive resource*. Springer International Publishing, 2019.
- Eyzaguirre, Nicolás, Pamela Figueroa Rubio and Tomás Jordán Díaz.** *Crisis del hiper-presidencialismo chileno y nueva constitución: ¿Cambio al régimen político?* Santiago: FLACSO, 2020.
- Freudenreich, Johannes.** “The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems.” *Latin American Politics and Society* **58** (2016): 80–102.
- Goertz, Gary.** *Social Science Concepts and Measurement: New and Completely Revised Edition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Handlin, Samuel.** “Venezuela: Development of a Highly Polarizing Party System.” In *State Crisis in Fragile Democracies: Polarization and Political Regimes in South America*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 57–100.
- Ide, Tobias.** “Why do conflicts over scarce renewable resources turn violent? A qualitative comparative analysis.” *Global Environmental Change* **33** (2015): 61–70.
- Kellam, Marisa.** “Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?” *British Journal of Political Science* **47** (2017): 391–411.
- Kemahlioglu, Ozge, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Shigeo Hirano.** “Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections?” *The Journal of Politics* **71** (2009): 339–352.
- Martínez, Christopher A. and Andrés Dockendorff.** “Hyper-Presidentialism under

- Question.” In Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet (Eds.), *Latin America in Times of Turbulence*. New York: Routledge, 2023, 54–74.
- McClintock, Cynthia.** *Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Mello, Patrick A.** *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: An Introduction to Research Design and Application*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021.
- Mimica, Nicolás and Patricio Navia.** “Where did Hyper-Presidentialism Go? The Origin of Bills and Laws Passed in Chile, 1990–2022.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* **16** (2024): 27–49.
- Murillo, María Victoria and Steven Levitsky.** “Crisis, boom, and the restructuring of the argentine party system (1999–2015).” In Noam Lupu, Virginia Oliveros, and Luis Schiumerini (Eds.), *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019.
- Oana, Ioana-Elena and Carsten Q. Schneider.** “SetMethods: an Add-on R Package for Advanced QCA.” *The R Journal* **10** (2018): 507–533.
- Oana, Ioana-Elena, Carsten Q. Schneider and Eva Thomann.** *Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using R: A Beginner’s Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Ragin, Charles C.** *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- Rodríguez Mójica, Alexis.** “PRD 1998: Transición institucional y reconversión política.” *Revista de Comunicación de la SEECI* **6** (2000): 111–124.
- Rutten, Roel.** *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Learning from Cases*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024.
- Rönkkö, Mikko, Markku Maula and Karl Wennberg.** “Qualitative Comparative

- Analysis in Entrepreneurship Research.” *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* **49** (2025): 963–991.
- Sandri, Giulia and Antonella Seddone.** *Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective*. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Schneider, Carsten Q.** “Realists and Idealists in QCA.” *Political Analysis* **26** (2018): 246–254.
- Schneider, Carsten Q. and Ingo Rohlfing.** “Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research.” *Sociological Methods & Research* **42** (2013): 559–597.
- Schneider, Carsten Q and Claudius Wagemann.** *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Siavelis, Peter M., Kirsten Sehnbruch, Emmanuelle Barozet and Valentina Ulloa.** “Public Appointments as Informal Institutions: Lessons From the Cuoteo in Chile, 1990-2018.” *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)* **42** (2022): 537–563.
- Spoon, Jae-Jae and Karleen Jones West.** “Alone or together? How institutions affect party entry in presidential elections in Europe and South America.” *Party Politics* **21** (2015): 393–403.
- Thijm, Joris and Jorge M. Fernandes.** “Parties and Coalition Governance in Presidential Democracies.” *Political Research Quarterly* **78** (2024): 481–494.
- Trinkunas, Harold A.** “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic.” *Latin American Research Review* **37** (2002): 41–76. Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP).
- Vommaro, Gabriel.** “De la construcción partidaria al gobierno: PRO-Cambiamos y los límites del “giro a la derecha” en Argentina.” *Colombia Internacional* **99** (2019): 91–120.

Vommaro, Gabriel and Mariana Gené. "Argentina: el año de Cambiemos." *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)* **37** (2017): 231–254.